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CHAPTER I
STAT~~iliNT

OF THE PROBLEM AND COLLECTION
AND TREATMENT OF DATA

British East Africa has long been the playground
of American millionaires , who have shot its wild game,
drunk whiskey on its lonely plains, marvelled at its
primitiveness , ignored its poverty , and proudly returned
home with cartons of trophies .
East Africa has not been well known in the United
States , its status as a paradise for hunters notwithstanding .

Americans have been preoccupied with other

things, and Africa has remained the dark continent for
them .

They recoil in horror when one tells of African

customs of marriage , puberty, mourning , or medicine .
Such practices represent , for the average man, the
epitome of degradation . l
However, since World War II , Afr ica has emerged
from its colonial status into full partnership with the
other nations of the world in all the affairs of mankind .
"The African is beginning to realize that he is a member

lHarold Lindsell , Missionary Principles and Practice
(Westwood , New Jersey : Fleming H. Revell Company , 1965) ,
p.

49 .

2

of the new ' one world .'

No longer will he accept with grati-

tude anything that is given him . u2

Africa, whether one

approves or not , is now the partner of other powers in
international affairs .
American involvement in Africa is of recent origin,
principally since \world \iar II :
• • • there has never been, until the end of
World War II, an actual policy commitment, a
systematic , continuous concern with African
affairs , unless a purely negative , passive
posture may be aescribed as continuous policy . 3
East Africa has played a vital role in the total
effort of Africans to emerge from colonial status to
that of independence .
To become conscious of community , define it, and
assert it, requires a complex development and, in the case
of Africa, the consent of the great political powers of
the world .
I•

b'l'A'l'ElviENT OF 'l'HE PROBLFJY1

Africa, because of the airect interests of nations
so closely allied with the United

~tates,

remained on the

2H . B. Young, "Black Africa beethes," Christian
Century, u2:131S- 19 , November 28 , 1945 .
3Henry 1 . Bretton , "United &tates Foreign Policy
Toward the Newly lnaependent btates, 11 African Independence
Peter Judd, editor (New York: Dell Publishing Company,
1962), p . 445 .

3
fringe of diplomatic concern until quite recently.

The

existence, however, of a democratic state, such as the
United States, with a history of revolution and a tradition
of resistance to non-democratic methods, served as a stimulant to Africans as they began to emerge into the arena of
political activity . 4
Identification of American and African ideals had
been made about the beginning of this century .5

Further

identification was encouraged by various people and circumstances throughout the years following World War I, especially in the period just prior to and during World War II . 6
W. E . B. DuBois and

~arcus

Garvey are generally con-

sidered the originators of the modern African national consciousness .

Both men were instrumental in awakening the

Africans to the possibility of national identity and
self-respect .
DuBois organized several Pan- African Congresses in
the years after 1900, the last one being held in London in
1945 . 7

He represented African aspirations at the Versailles

4Tom J . Mboya, "Our Revolutionary Tradition: An African
View," Current History, 31:346, December, 1956.
5Hans Kohn and Wallace Sokolsky, African Nationalism
in the Twentieth Century {Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company,
Incorporated, 1965), p . 21 .

6Ibid .

7Ibid., p . 25.

4
Peace Conference in 1919 . 8

Circulating freely throughout

the world, DuBois encouraged young Africans to assert their
peculiar identities .
American documents of state are studded with slogans
praising the virtues of democracy .

Statements of the presi-

dents gave comfort to the aspiring nationalists, especially
in the years after 1945 .
The Atlantic Charter was quoted by the London Conference of African nationalists as evidence that the Western
Allies would give independence to their colonial peoples.
Third, they respect the right of all peoples
to choose the form of government under which they
will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights
and self- government restored to those who have
been forcibly deprived of them.9
President Truman's concern for the East European
countries evoked statements designed to persuade the
Russians to give them freedom of choice.

Africans under-

stood his statements to be universally applicable and
insisted that self- determination be granted to themselves
as well as to Europeans . 10

gibid .
9winston s. Churchill, ~ Grand Alliance (Vol . III
of The Second World War . 6 vols . ; Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1951), p . 443.
l~arry s . Truman, ~-g, Years of Trial and Hope
{New York : Signet Books, 1930T, pp . 263 ff .

5
Ytr. Truman was preoccupied with Europe.

His concern

with Africa was limited to the North , and that he gave no
credence to the possibility that Black Africa was headed
for independence is evident.

Speaking on foreign policy

at Navy Day celebrations in 1945, he said:
We believe that all peoples who are prepared
for self-government should be permitted to choose
their own form of government by their own freely
expressed choice, without interference from any
foreign source. That is true in Europe, in Asia
in Africa, as well as in the Western Hemisphere.il
East ana Central Africa were important to the United
States for two reasons.

First, most of the uranium used in

atomic enterprises came from the Belgian Congo, as well as
other strategic metals in Central Africa. 12 Second, East
and Central Africa was to become a staging area for troops
if tte Russians began to advance southward through the
~liddle

East and the Mediterranean area.
The first of these made it imperative that the free

flow of materials be maintained to the Western World .

The

Western nations are dependent upon the mineral resources of
Central Africa.

llHarry S. Truman, ~, Year of Decisions (New York:
Signet Books, 1955), pp. 590-91.
12Rupert Emerson, "The Character of American Interests
in Africa," in The United States and Africa, Walter Goldschmidt, editor-rNew York:-rreaerick A. Praeger, 1963), p . 5.

6

Because of its geographical relationship to
the highways of the 1v~.edi terrane an, to the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, and to the oil fields of
the Middle East , Africa would immediately become
part of the global front line in the event of
war . If the influence of the West continues to
deteriorate in Egypt and the Arab areas generally,
East Africa in particular would be an indispensable staging area . 13
The second called for elaborate planning and covert
operations to prepare for the eventuality of war with
Russia.

Communications were to be established between the

Atlantic and Indian Oceans .
for future traffic .

Ports had to be made adequate

Hailways had to be built.

had to be planned and built, if possible .

Highways

Air bases had to

be strategically located in the area to protect the
installations . l4
M. s . A. and other loans can be regarded as
"economic statesmanship" only if the well-being
of the territories receiving them is considered
synonymous with the interests of their European
exploiters . l5
East Africa was strategically indispensable in plans
for the defense of the Western Hemisphere .

The paper will

elaborate on these involvements . l6

l3c . \I . De Kiewiet, "African Dilemmas , " Foreign
Affairs, 33:445, April, 1955 .
14Basil Davidson, "Cashing in on Old Imperialisms,"
Nation, 175:209, ~eptember 13, 1952 .
15Ibid., p . 210 .
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The United States "discovered" Africa in 1952 .

In

that year l•Iau l•iau broke to the surface in Kenya ana began
it.s blooay career in the news of the world . 1 7 "It was not
until 1952, indeed, that the African continent as a whole
thrust itself decisively upon the American counsciousness . n18
Prior to 1952, little was known of East Africa by most
Americans .

However, 1•lau 1'-fau changea that .

The world began

to know about Kenya .
In 1958 the

~tate

Departffient formed an entirely new

section for the continent of Africa .

Until then the affairs

of Africa haa been handled through the appropriate European
section . 1 9
In the meantime, by its membership on the Trusteeship Council of the united Nations, the Unitea States had
taken the side of the black Africans in Tanganyika, insisting that progress toward self- government be allowed and
encouraged by the British . 2 0

17c . L . ~ulzberger, "I··1au r~Iau," The Ne~ York Times,
December 28, 1952, page 3 .
lBRichard P. ~tebbins (ed . ), ~he United States in
World Affairs, ~ (Ne\'/ York: H~rper and brothers, 1953),
p . 248 .
19Bretton, loc . cit .
20Richard P. Stebbins (ed . ), The United States in
\~orld Affairs, 1222 (New York: harper and Brothers, 1960),
p . 2b8 .

Education became a determining factor in the struggle for independence, as young men began to seize the
initiative from the reactionary colonials .

V~ny

students came to the United 5tates to study .

African

They usually

studied political science and turned their knowledge
against their colonial rulers . 21
Also, Americans worked in the educational institutions within the countries .

~lissionaries,

especially,

were active, often carrying the main burden of educating
the Africans . 22
The United States has been deeply involved in the
freedom movement in Africa .

The full story of that

involvement has not yet been told .

It is the goal of this

study to make known the American role in Bast Africa.
II .
Relations .

DEFINITION OF

'l'B~iS

This word is used to mean all those con-

tacts between Americans and Africans of the British sphere
of East Africa.

Usage is not limited to governmental or

21Tom J . Mboya, Freedom and After (London: Andre
Deutsch, Limited, 1963), p. 146 .
22Johnni Johnson, What Do ~tissionaries Do?
(Nashville: Broadman Press, 19b4), p. 12 .
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official relationships .

All those relations which have

affectea , or been affectea by , the development of nationalism in British East Africa are included .
Nationalism .

Nationalism is used in a broad sense

to include more than politics .

All those feelings of

community which form the basis of national identity are
embodied in the term .
African .

The word African is used to distinguish

between the nationalist tendencies of the black African ,
the Asian , and the
in

~uropean .

All these groups are resident

Africa and nationalistic ties have knitted each

~ast

group to6ether within the larger context .

The particular

concern of the paper is with the development of nationalism
among the black Africans .
British

~ast

Africa .

The area of Africa known as

British East Africa is composed of the four countries of
Uganda, Kenya , tanganyika and Zanzibar (1anzania) .
Since

~.

relations since the

Of primary interest is the tracing of
~econd

World War, with 1945 used as

the generalized date for the end of the war .

However ,

certain events ant e cedent to that year are included because
they are germane to the discussion .

One chapter is given

to a discussion of the Pan- African development from 1900
to 1945 .

10
III .

ORGANIZATION OF THE S'IUDY

Chapter two is devoted to the development of African
nationalism from 1900 to 1945, with particular reference to
its American origins .

This chapter deals with the Pan-

African Congresses and the important contributions made
by W. E. B. DuBois and l•iarcus Garvey .
Chapter three is given to the development of American attituues toward African nationalism in the years from
1945 to 1965 .

This chapter shows the gradual change of

attitude from that which leaves the Africans completely in
the hanus of the colonial powers to that of active participation in the movement toward independence .
The following chapters are concerned with topical
subjects.

They include material from the 1945- 65 period,

but they are developed topically rather than chronologically.
A chapter is devoted to a discussion of the relevance
of American political ideology to the African development .
The discussion is concerned with American ideals and actual
involvement of the United States in the political organization of the African states .
Economic matters are given separate treatment .
That the United States has a vested interest in the

11

stability of African states is evident and that this has
been a motive for activity in Africa is a reasonable
conclusion.
~tissionary

enterprises have been active in East

Africa since the nineteenth century .

American religious

groups have been interested chiefly in the last thirty
years, ana they have been instrumental in the development
of African national feeling.

Their motives are mixed,

combining Christian zeal with more mundane cultural
motives .
Education has played a decisive role in the preparation of Africans for self-government .

Americans have

played a prominent role in this field .
A concluding chapter summarizes the American
interests in East Africa .

IV.

DELIMITATIONS OF TH.i!. S'l'UDY

This study is concerned with the United States'
relationship to the development of the awareness of
national identity among the African population of
British East Africa .
The study is not concerned with other nations,
except as they are incidental to the stated problem .

12

V.

SOURC~S

OF DATA

Sources for this study include the personal papers
of the presidents, memoirs of the presidents, policy
papers of the Department of State, various books which
analyze the relations of states internationally , newspapers,
with special reliance on The New York Times, religious and
secular journals, news magazines, United Nations journals,
and the unpublished minutes of the Baptist Mission of East
Africa .

CHAPTER II
THE ORIGINS OF AFRICAN NATI0NALISM
August, 1945 brought the end of V.orld 'k'iar II, the
greatest paroxysm of carnage ever suffered by the nations
of earth .

In the swirling up- draft of the fission bomb,

the hopes of the Japanese to establish an oriental hegemony
was brought to an ignominious close, just as Germany had
been forced to abandon her aream of European domination a
few months before .
Those anguishea days could not obscure the stirring
of Asian nationalism which had been in evidence for many
years .

Out of the post- war adjustments emerged a new

family of nations .

They were Asian nations, primarily,

with the Arabs also receiving the right of self-government .

ing .

In the midst of the cataclysm another wind was blowYears later it would be called "the wind of change . n23

But , very few men in positions of control could foresee
Africa's surge toward independence .

In 1945, few thought of

the "dark continent" as potentially able to govern itself .
Yet, within fifteen years of the ena of •iorld War II,
nearly all the geographical subdivisions of Africa were

23nc.hanging Wind, 11 Time, 75:38, F'ebruary 15, 1960 .
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self-governing.

Nationalism was at work, and what had

seemed impossible in 1945 was an actuality in 1960.
What caused this sudden rush to independence?

Had

Africans, without a history of their own suddenly blossomed
without benefit of seed-time and growth?

Had these backward

peoples n1erely taken advantage of a momentary pause in the
all-encompassing domination of Europeans over the rest of
the world?

Was the judgment true, which was made by some,

that Africans had no historical preparation for selfgovernment?24

Could the world look to Africans with

expectations of order and friendly participation in the
politics of the world?25
The progress of African countries toward independence
was not rapid, of course.

In fact, the era of colonialism

was but an interlude in the history of the continent.
Political organization in Africa was notable and extensive
in the early part of this millenium, marked by the existence of the ancient states of Mali , Ghana, Songhai, Bornu,
and other lesser states.

Actually, colonialism was an

24sir Philip Mitchell, "Africa and the West in Historical Perspective," Africa Today , C. Grove Haines, editor
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), p . 3.
25Henry L. Bretton , uunited 8tates Foreign Policy
Toward the Newly Independent States," African Independence ,
Peter Judd, editor (New York : Dell Publishing Company ,
1962), p. 447.
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interruption of African political organization, rather than
the beginning.26
All authorities on Africa acknowledge that t he United
States was the incubator of modern African nationalism .
This is recognized by African nationalists themselves . 2 7
American Negroes developed an interest in their
African origins, and this interest grew until it became a
deep sense of Negro identity .

Kohn and Sokolsky point out:

Carter G. Woodson, founder of the Journal of
Negro History, was pre - eminent in this absorp:tion in the African background, his The African
Background Outlined being a symbol of the
aroused interest.28
Next, in their order of appearance and importance ,
were \l . E . B. DuBois and l•mrcus Garvey .

DuBois made his

entrance at the first Pan-African meeting in 1900 . 2 9
Garvey appeared in the 1920's but quickly passed from the
scene when he was prosecuted for irregularities in his
affairs . 3°

DuBois is generally accepted as the nrather"

2 6Donald Weidner, A History of Africa South of the
Sahara (New York: Vintage Books, 1904), pp . 6 et ~ ·
27Hans Kohn and Wallace Sokolsky, African
Nationalism in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: D. Van
Nostrand Compan~l965) , p . 25 .
28rbid • , p . 22 •
2 9Basil Davidson, vfuich Way Africa?
England: Penguin Books, 1964), p . 61 .
3~ohn and Sokolsky, loc . cit .
RILEV-HICKINGBOTHAM UBRARY
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of Pan- Africanism although others , too, have played an
important part in creating an interest in the "African
personality . n3l
A series of Pan- African meetings was held following
the 1900 conclave .

Colin Legum lists six of these, begin-

ning with the 1900 meeting and ending with the l".1anchester
Congress of 1945 . 3 2
The Congress of 1900 set the tenor of the meetings
which followed .

Those who organized and directed the meet-

ing were concerned with Negro rights primarily , but those
rights were irrevocably bound up with their African origins
and kinship with all living Africans .

Basil Davidson points

out :
These men looked across to Africa with a
bitter awareness of their own unity in disfranchisement: here in the New \lorld all
Africans had lost their separate ethnic loyalties, languages , cultures , sense of difference
from one another; ana so it appeared natural
to regard all Africans as belonging to the
same great territorial unit, Africa, however
much that unit might be divided within itself
by "the frontiers of foreign rule . n33

3lrbid ., p . 21 .
3 2colin Legum , Pan-Africanism {New York : Frederick A.
Pr aeger , 1962}, pp . 24- 32 .
33navidson , loc . cit .
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The first meeting of a Pan-African nature occurred
just at the turn of the century, when the colonial powers
were in the process of consolidating their gains on the
African continent, and when anti- Negro sentiment was at
i ts height in the United

~tates .

The world climate in

1900 reveals two of the objectives of Pan- Africanism in its
larger involvements .

First, of course, is the objective of

ejecting the colonial nations from the African lands .
and not so obvious, is the universal Negro protest

~econd,

against racism, particularly that of the American and West
Indian Negroes, which remains an aim of Pan-Africanism . 34
The second of the Pan-African Congresses was held in
1919 during the Versailles Peace Conference .

There, incon-

gruously, DuBois, and others, were engaged in conversations
with the men who were attempting to re - establish the
balance of power in Europe, and to make equitable redistribution of African colonies among the victors in World
War

r)5
Africans at Paris were not subdued, nor were they

timid in their demands on the colonial powers .

Basil

Davidson makes the follo\V"ing comment:

34Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa, 'l'he Politics of
Independence (New York : Vintage Books, 1961), p. l05:35Kohn and Sokolsky,

QE •

cit . , p . 25 .
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The delegates boldly addressed themselves to
the Powers . They called on them to "establish a
code of law for the international protection of
the natives of Africa , similar to the proposed
international code for labour, " and laia down a
list of "principles" by which "the natives of
Afri ca and the peoples of Africq.n descent"
should hencefort h be governed . 3o
That the gains of the Africans at Paris were unimpressive is no surprise, for the Europeans were only beginning to gain control of their African colonies .

To consider

granting them independence was unreasonable to them .

Addi-

t ionally, vloodro\'1 \'lilson was not prepared to insist that
pr ovisions be incorporated in the Peace Treaty, other than
that the Trusteeship system be set up , whereby colonial
territories of the Central Powers were mandated to the
vi ctorious Allies .

Yet , the influence of the 1919 Congress

was important and lasting , and within that Congress, the
dominating figure was DuBois .

As Davidson remarks :

• • • these demands of the secona congress
pointed forward to a steady crystallization of
new ideas . They were Pan- African and they were
libertarian . Moreover, and the influence of
DuBois counted for much in this, they gave due
weight to the customs and beliefs of pre - colonial
Africa- - to all that complex of tradition which had
carried Africans through the years before the
conquest . 3 7
The demands of the Congress included preservation of
land , conservation of natural resources , regulation of

36Davidson , 2£· cit ., p . 62 .
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investment and concessions, abolition of slavery and forced
labor, education at public expense for all Africans, and
the speedy grant of political rights.38

However, even the

radical men of Pan-Africanism recognized a need for preparation of Africans for governmental participation, and did
not mention independence.39
The next two Pan-African Congresses did not accomplish much .

But, they served the purpose of keeping the

movement alive and preserving the spirit of African
identity.

The third Congress was held in 1921 and met in

London, Brussels, and Paris, with forty-one of the delegates
coming from Africa.4°
The American character of the movement remained as
the Congress of 1923 met .

"In fact, DuBois acknowledges,

even after the third Pan-African Congress, held in London
and Lisbon, in 1923, that the Pan-African idea was still
American rather than African .u41
During the twenties 1>'1arcus Garvey made his sweep
across the Pan- African scene, saying, "'we believe in the
freedom of Africa for the Negro people of the world •

39Legum, .2.£· g_.,
.t
p . 4')9 •
4°Kohn and Sokolsky, .2.£• cit., p . 2b .
4lrbid.

• •
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we also demand Africa for the Africans at home and
abroad.rn42

Such precepts, pronounced with all the fer-

vency of an evangelist, fell on responsive ears throughout
the world.
Garvey was ambitious and organized various enterprises, including the Universal African Legion, an African
Orthodox Church, and the Black Star Lines . 43
His parent organization was called the Universal
Negro Improvement Association, and served as his base of
operation.

Through the official voice of the organization,

Negro \wrld, Garvey proclaimed the motto of his movement:
"One God, One Aim, One Destiny .n44
Garvey's influence upon the nationalist movement in
Africa was far-reaching .

Kwame Nkrumah paid him homage by

attributing to him many of the basic concepts which he
held and practiced.45
His contemporaries were sympathetic, but critical of
the methods Garvey used to further his goals .

J . A. Rogers,

a close associate of Garvey, makes this observation:

42~1arcus Garvey, quoted by Kohn and Sokolsky in
African Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, p. 23 .

43Kohn and Sokolsky, 2£ · cit., p. 23.
44Ibid.

45Ib . .

----1:£·' p.
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"His cause was just, too, but his methods were
twisted, archaic, perverse. He undoubtedly wanted
to help the downtroaden blacks but like every other
autocrat believed that the end justifies the
means • • •"4b
DuBois, dedicated Africanist that he was, criticized Garvey severely for his intemperate propaganda, poor
finance, demagogic tendencies, and the apprehension he
aroused among the colonial nations who controlled the
destiny of the African people .47
The fourth Pan-African Congress, or fifth in the
reckoning of Colin Legum, was held in New York in 1927.
Only a few Africans were present and the Pan- African
movement was experiencing a decline.

Shortly the depres-

sion would strike the world and further efforts would be
hampered by the lack of funds.4 8
However, the cause was not lost.

The efforts of

DuBois and his aides were not to be lost in the pages of
history, for at the close of World

~ar

II the last and most

important meeting of the Pan-African movement convened

46J. A. Rogers, quoted by Kohn and Sokolsky in
African Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, p . 24 .
47w. E . B. DuBois, quoted by Kohn ana Sokolsky in
African Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, p. 24 .
4 8Kohn and Sokolsky , 2E· cit., p . 27.
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at

i~lanchester,

England, a suburb of London, and carried the

vision of DuBois to fruition.

Kohn and Sokolsky agree

that:
The Fifth Pan-African Congress in 1945 was
far more important than any of its predecessors .
Again, DuBois was a moving spirit but this time,
Africans themselves played a major role in the
proceedings . Two hundred delegates met in
Manchester, England, October 15-21; prominent
among them were Dr . P . l·l . l11illiard, 'f . R.
l•1akonnen, George Paa.more, Kwame Nkrumah, Peter
Abrahams, and Jomo Kenyatta . 49
In the 1930's and 1940's, increasing numbers of
Africans went abroad to study .

'l'hey suffered misery,

rejection, loneliness, and alienation , but they persevered,
keeping the goal of African self-determination always
before them .

Kenyatta studied in Britain .

others, travelled to the United States .

Nkrumah , and

Nkrumah, the

future leader of Ghana organized the African Students'
Association of America and Canada, which \vas an expression
of the Pan-Africanist influence from North America . 50
These men, possessed by a vision of independence
for their continent, were the moving spirit of 1•ianchester ,
making it the most important of all the Pan- African
Congresses.

Kohn and Sokolsky further point out that:

50ibid ., p. 22 .
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. • • it was this Fifth Pan-African Congress
that provided the outlet for African nationalism
ana brought about the awakening of African political consciousness. It became, in fact, a mass
movement of Africa for the Africans.'l
Perhaps the explanation for the energy generated by
the J.1anchester conference of 1945 is to be found in the
fact that a majority of those present were African.

The

movement became African rather than American, and it
became a dynamic movement.52
Also, the apprehension aroused by the Pan-African
movement was, no doubt, caused by its distinct orientation
toward IvJ.a.rxism .53

Colin Legum asserts that:

For the first time we find the forthright
challenge: "We demand for Black Africa autonomy
ana indepenaence, so far, and no further, than
it is possible in this one worla for groups and
peoples to rule themselves s~bject to inevitable
world unity and federation."'4
The determined men at J.!anchester were no longer calling for justice within the framework of colonialism, but
for the right to determine their own destinies, in their
own ways, according to their own traditions, and by their
own institutions.

5libid. , p . 2$.

53 Ibid .

54colin Legum, Pan- Africanism (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1962), p. 32, quoting documents of the 1945 PanAfrican Congress at Manchester , England .
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The Congress of lv'lanchester set up an organization
with a permanent secretary and a journal.

Although it

later was to be banned in the colonies, the journal served
as an expression of the npositive actionn called for by
the Congress.

11

Aided by the world-wide surge of anti-

imperialism , Pan-Africanism entered a new phase--the march
toward freedom--freedom for individual African countries.n55
The Manchester Congress cited a document which had
been prepared several years before its meeting, and which
was written without thought of the Africans south of the
Sahara, the Atlantic Charter:
Bringing its deliberations to a close, it asked
the colonial powers to honor the Atlantic Charter,
and ended its plea with, "We are determined to be
free • • • Therefore, we shall complain , appeal
and arraign. \',e will make the world listen to the
facts of our condition. Ue will fight in every way
we can for freedom, democracy and social betterment.n56
Particular reference was to the third article of the
Charter, which said, "They respect the right of all peoples
to choose the form of gov ernment under which they will
live; • • •

•

n57

55Kohn and Sokolsky , ££• cit., p. 29.

5~ohn and Sokolsky , African Nationalism in the
Twentieth Century, p . 28, citing the Atlantic Charter.
57winston s . Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Vol. III
of The Second World \'far . 6 vols . ; Boston: Houghton :fv1ifflin
Company , 1951), p. 443, citing Article III of the Atlantic
Charter.
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That document, drawn as a proclamation of AngloAmerican unity and for the inspiration of the East Europeans in the depths of war, stirred excitement beyond
comprehension in the minds of Africans.

Albert Luthuli,

the dean of South African nationalists, makes the following statement :
In the Xuma era (1940-49}, Congress gradually
began to take on a new character. It began to
formulate its aims and policy far more clearly
than hitherto. Inspired by the Atlantic Charter,
and by a war for human freedom, it drew up a
precise document called "Africa Claims."
Young men began to come into t heir own, and the
Congress Youth League injected new determ~na
tion and vitality into the organization.58
\'/hat was true of South Africa was true of the rest
of Africa.

Those men, mostly young men, dedicated to the

proposition that Africa should detennine its own course,
took their inspiration from the United

~tates.

East Africa was an integral part of that movement.
Kenyatta, the revered leader of nationalism in Kenya, was
a participant in the

~~nchester

Congress.

An unusual circumstance made nationalism easily
transmitted in East Africa.

A lingua franca, Kiswahili,

and the rule of Britain over all the political aivisions,

58Albert Luthuli, Let
Books, 1963}, p . 89 .

Mx

People Go (London: Fontana
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gave the nationalists there a feeling of unity and the
ability to communicate with one another with a facility
unknown in much of the continent . 59
What had begun in 1900 as the expression of protest
by American Negroes, culminated in 1960 in the independence of sixteen African nations . 60

Appropriately, the man

who seized the opportunity of 1900 t o demand recognition
of Negro rights , W. E. B. DuBois , lived to see the "great
year of independence . n61
The patriarch of African nationalism died on
August 27 , 1960, a citizen of Ghana , and an avowed
Communist . He was ninety-five years of age . 62 His contri bution to the nationalist movement of Africa will be
diffi cult to assess, but it is true, beyond doubt, that
no one contributed more to the inception and nurture of
the spirit of Negro self-consciousness than William
Edwar d Burghardt DuBois .

59Kohn and Sokolsky, ££ • cit . , p . 90 .
60Davidson, ££ • cit ., p . 64 .
61 Ibid .
62Kohn and Sokolsky, ££ • cit . , p. 97 .
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~1oaern

African nationalism was begun in the United

States by Dubois, Garvey and others.

Though one may not

assert that the government of the United States exerted
much influence, for it manifestly did not encourage the
movement until the late 1950's, it must be recognized
and credited that the original impetus for African national

consciousness was American--Negro American, which identified
with all men of color in a struggle for recognition and
independence.

CHAPTER III
THE
I.

PROGR~SS

OF

M~~RICAN

POLICY

POST- WAR INTERNA1IGNAL POLITICS

Nineteen forty-five was the year of triumph for the
Western Allies.

Germany was finally overwhelmed, when she

would not capitulate unconditionally.

Months later, after

the aevastating introduction of the Atomic Age, Japan also
was in subjection to the Allied Powers .
President Truman called 1945 the "year of decisions ." 03
'lhe title was appropriate, for 'lruman assumed the Presidency
with little knowledge of what had been the substance of
policy under Roosevelt.

He was left with the aecision about

employing the atomic bomb, ana countless other vexing
problems.
One of the most determinative events of the year was
the conference neld at Potsdam.

Here, the new President con-

ferreci with Stalin, Churchill and others .

For 'I'ruman, the

critical element of the conference was the personality of
Stalin.

He remarked after the meeting , "Force is the only
thing the Russians understanct.n 64

~,

63Harry ~. 'lruman titled Volume I of his memoirs,
Year of Decisions.

04Harry ~. Truman, lli.2_, Year of Decisions (Vol. I of
lv1emoirs. 2 vols.; New York : ~ignet Books, 1955), p. 454.
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The Potsdam Conference had been called because no
understanding could be reached about Eastern Europe,
especially Poland.65

Poland became a focal point in the

lack of understanding between the Western Allies and
burgeoning Russia.
Truman was an idealist and he could not comprehend
the attitude of Stalin in regard to Eastern Europe.

Repeat-

edly he stated his idealism in words like those delivered
to the Congress at the death of Roosevelt:

"In this shrink-

ing world, it is futile to seek safety behind geographical
barriers.

Real security will be found only in law and in

justice." 66
Later, when the United Nations was forged in San
Francisco, Truman delivered the following statement of
ideals:

"With this charter the world can begin to look

forward to the time when all worthy human beings may be
permitted to live decently as free people.n67
Again, in October, 1945, speaking at Navy Day celebrations in New York City, Truman said:

65Ibid., p. 292 .

6~arry s . Truman, Public Parers of the Presidents,
(Washington: Government Printing Of ice, 19blT, p. ).
67Ibid. , p. 142.
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We believe that all peoples who are prepared
for self- government should be permitted to choose
their own form of government by their own freely
expressed choice, without interference from any
foreign source . That is true in ~urope, in Asia
in Africa, as well as in the Western Hemisphere.68
These statements placed him diametrically opposite
Stalin, who was working diligently to bring the Eastern
European nations under Russian hegemony .

Truman could not

understand why Stalin refused to accept the statements of
the Western Allies that they were seeking to live in peaceful relationships .
The President expected that Russia would be willing to cooperate in the post- war arrangement of the world
in such a way as to avoid the likelihood of another war
on the scale of World War II .

The conference at Yalta, at

which Roosevelt was quite ill and unable to match wits with
Stalin, gave credence to the expectations of Truman .

He had

reason to believe that Russia was interested in preserving
a balance of power in the world based on the conclusions of
Yalta .
It had been agreed at Yalta that the United
States, Britain , Russia, China, and France would
draw up a new trusteeship system to replace the
mandate system of the League of Nations . These
five nations were to make up the permanent

bSibid . , p . 434 .
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membership of the Security Council . This trusteeship machinery would be made a part of the
charter . 69
Truman's awakening came when Russia would not allow
a genuinely represent ative coalition government to be formed
in Poland .

It was in response to the problem of Poland that

the Potsdam Conference was called .

At that meeting it became

evident that Russia had her own plans for other parts of the
world .

Of course , it was not a secret that Russia had

designs on Eastern Europe .

That was written in the history

of the relations of Russia with her European neighbors .
Potsdam revealed that Russia held some hopes of gaining a
part of the North African territory formerly held by Italy . 7°
That Russia had an interest in the 1'-tiddle East was
no surprise , but that she held hopes of establishing herself as a I·lediterranean power , especially in Africa , was
significant .

Churchill seemed to be aware of this desire,

but Truman was not . 71
An outline of the direction in which Russia was mov-

ing would begin with Poland , through the Eastern

~uropean

countries of Czechoslovakia , Hungary, Romania , Bulgaria,

69Truman,

J:ID,

Year of Decisions, p. 304 .

7°rbid ., pp . 412- 13 .

32
the Balkan

~tates,

Greece, and Libya.

The latter was a

matter for the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations,
but the others were vulnerable and Stalin set out to establish friendly governments in all of those areas.

In all of

these, except Africa and Greece, Russia was successful in
having her way, managing to carry them along in the way
she would have them go.72
Greece was a prime target for the Communists, and the
period just after the war was a time of civil disturbance,
designed to establish there a government friendly to Russia.
Truman successfully countered this move with the Truman
Doctrine in 1947, enabling forces who were friendly to the
West to re-establish their power.73
The Truman Doctrine, not surprisingly, also included
other areas, particularly those of the Middle East which
bordered on Russian territory.74

The whole tier of nations

from Greece to Iran was included in the statement of policy
made to the Congress on

~~rch

12, 1947:

72Harry s . 'l'ruman, 1946-g, Years of Trial and Hope
(Vol. II of Memoirs . 2 vols.; New York: ~ignet Books, 1956),
p. 277.
73Ibid., pp. 127-29.
74Ibid.
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I believe • • • that it must be the policy of
the United States to support free peoples who
are resisting attempted subjugation by armed
minorities or by outside pressures. I believe
that we must assist free peoples to work out
their own destinies in their own way . 75
In response to the Russian pressure on her neighbors
in Europe and the .:rv1iddle Bast, and the suspected designs
she had on other areas of the world, the 'l'ruman administration devised a policy of "containment.n76

The Western

Powers would restrict the Russian expansion, not allowing
her to conquer any more territory.
Regarding Africa, it was the policy of the United
States to remain aloof from the problems of that portion
of the world out of deference to her allies.

In the meeting

between Clement Atlee, McKensie-King and Truman on November 10-15, 1945, not a word is mentionea regarding the implications of their statements for African dependencies . 77
Also, in 1ruman ' s memoirs there is no mention of the
implications of his foreign policy speech on Navy Day, 1945,

75Ibid .
76George F . Kennan, "'l'he ~ources of ;:,oviet Cona.uct,"
Foreign Affairs, 25:5bb-82, July, 1947.
77Truman, ~, Year of Decisions, pp. 591-98 .
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in which he advocated giving self- government to people who
were ready . 78
American expressions of sympathy for national feeling
were regular occurrences, and Truman makes the following
statement in his ?Jiemoirs :
I had always been opposed to colonialism .
vfuatever justification may be cited at any
stage , colonialism in any form, is hateful
to Americans . America fought her own \'lar of
liberation against colonialism, and we shall
always regard with sympathy and understanding
the desire of peo2le everywhere to be free of
colonial bondage . /9
Truman unquestionably understood the role of the
United States in the post- war world, remarking that:
Out of this conflict have come powerful military
nations, now fully trained ana equipped for war .
But they have no right to aominate the world . It
is rather the duty of these powerful nations to
assume the responsibility for leadership toward a
world of peace . That is why we have here resolved
that power and strength shall be used not to wage
war , but to keep the world at peace, ana free
from the fear of war . BO
The role of Russia was also appreciated in the United
~tates .

One analysis of the economic alignments of the

world, by Alvin

\·1 .

Hansen, sums up this role :

7Bibid .
80Ibid . , p . 324 .

?9Ibid • , p . 3 Ob .
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vfuat, now, are the prospects after World War II?
A great new fact emerges from vlorld \-ar II . It
will change the face of ~urope . It will profoundly dominate the course of world history in
the generations that lie before us .
This great new fact is the rise of Russia on
one side of the globe and the economic and
military power of the United States on the
other . A happy geographical accident--two great
powers occupying vast continents and controlling
vast resources in areas that are noncompetitive - this fact must be set down as a dominating and
directing force in the fut~re course of history . Sl
This quite hopeful assessment of the rivalry between
Russia and the United States was based on the geographical
separation of the interests of the two powers.S2
Hansen's geographical theory is interesting, as is
his assessment of the post - war power of Britain .

~uch

an

estimate would explain the United States' reluctance to
bring pressure to bear on matters relating to the colonies .
In between those two powers on opposite sides
of the globe is the British Bmpire which emerges
from \lorld War II absolutely stronger than ever
before . SJ
Had Britain been able to assume her former role in
the world, the alignment would have been of a different nature .

However, Britain was not able to take her former place

SlAlvin H. Hansen, America 1 s Role in the \'torld
Economy (New York : W. W. ~orton and Gompany, 1945), p . 16 .
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in the world economy or government, as Truman realized near
the end of his tenure .

In early 1952, Churcnill came to the

United States for urgent consultations with Truman . B4
At that time , 'l'he New York Times stateci that the
British problem was basically economic .

She imported more

than she expor ted and her reserves were dropping, placing
her in a precarious economic position . B5
The relative weakness of Britain was becoming apparent, and the implications for the United States were emphasized by the fact that Truman and Churchill gave a large
portion of their conversations to the problem of strategic
metal imports , from Africa , as well as their division among
the ~lest ern Allies . Bb
Topics on the agenda included the Atlantic community ,
Bast ,
raw materials problems, Germany , NATO ana atomic energy . 87
~oviet

policy , the Far

~ast ,

Southeast Asia, the

~tiddle

B4The New York 1imes , January b, 1952 , page 4 , col . 1 .
85rbia .
B6James Reston , "Truman and Churchill Thresh Out
and Production Problems , " The New York Times,
1:7, January 8, 1952 .

~1ilitary

B7James Reston , "Churchill Begins TalKs with Truman,"
The New York Times, January b , 1952, p . 65 .
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Submerged in this maze of problems was the fact that practically all of the fissionable materials for atomic energy
came from the Belgian Congo, and a great portion of the
copper came from the central African area, which included
the Congo, and the Rhodesias .
Africa , as a part of the world's power structure,
had not yet emerged .

But, the statements of ideology,

which were unavoidably encouraging to the African national ists, were continuing .

'l'he seeming commitment of the United

States to the principle of self-determination was feeding
the flame of rebellion among the black people of the world .
And, there were reassessments of the importance of the British Empire, making more realistic appraisals of its strength
and resilience , because, since 1945, Britain had lost some
four hundred million people from its contro1 . 88
Beca~se

of the impending demise of the British Empire ,

and the tendency of Americans to look upon themselves as the
saviours of mankind, the statements of officials began to
sound charismatic .

Truman, in his State of the Union message

of 1952 , said:
"The things we believe in most deeply are under
relentless attack . We have the great responsibility

88The New York Times, January 6, 1952, page 4.

------
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of saving the basic mqral and spiritual values
of our civilization.n89
John Foster Dulles , a Special Advisor to the State
Department, remarked:
" It is worth remembering that our nation had
its greatest influence for good and also its
greatest security during the last century,
when we had little military strength and were
not wealthy enough to give much away, • • •
our greatness lay in producing exportable
ideas.n90
II.

THE UNITED STATES "DISCOVERS" AFRICA

Africa remained on the fringe of American diplomatic
concern.

Through all the years following \forld War II,

the Western Allies were preoccupied with matters in Europe ,
the Iv1iddle East , and Asia.
The links between the United States and Africa
extend far back into history; yet Africa was the
last of the inhabited continents to assume a regular place in the grand design of American foreign
policy.91

B9Harry S . Truman , quoted in The New York Times,
January 10, 1952, page 16.
90John Foster Dulles, quoted in The New York Times ,
January 2, 1952, page 2.
91Richard P . btebbins (ed.), The United States in
World Affairs, 1961 (New York : Harper-ind Brothers , 19b2),
p . 234.
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Events were not to leave the United 0tates free to
ignore the continent after 1952, for the spotlight of
American concern centered upon Africa during that year .
Some Americans were already aware of the problems of
Africa.

'l'he Manchester Congress had not passed unnoticed

by everyone, ana not everyone was indifferent to the fate
of Africans .

An article in Christian Century in June, 1945 ,

had advocated that the Western

Po~;ers

recognize in the

peace treaties that Africa was not the " • • • rightful
possession or permanent asset of .Buropean nations . "
Further, the article urged that " • • • principles enunciated in the Atlantic Charter should be made applicable
to Africa, • • •

•

n92

Yet, the United States continued to view Africa as
a province of Europe .

It was not possible that America

would view Africa with indifference, but, she did regard
the continent as out of bounds for political interests .
One journalist has observed:
" • • • our lack of knowledge and contact on
the one hand and our close ana vital relationship
with Burope, the master of Africa, on the other,

92H. . B. l'o1cC1enahan, "Africa lJeserves a Break,"
Christian Century, 62:707-08, June 13, 1945 .
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led us to view Africa primarily through ~uropean
eyes. This is leading us to act in Africa on
the basis of European interests.93
Africa received scant attention from American interests, either goverrunental or private.

"Our foreign aid

programs made only token contributions to African development.

Of our

~30

billion of overseas investment, less than

three per cent was in Africa . n94
East Africa burst on the scene in 1952 .

One is im-

pressea as he scans the issues of The New York Times, to
find that before 1952 very little was written about developments in

~ast

africa; yet, from the early part of 1952, that

area of the world was quite prominent in the news.

Begin-

ning then, however, countless news items and articles were
printed exposing the happenings in Africa.95
~iorthy

of note also was the suggestion in Iv1ay, 1952,

that a mid-African conference, led by the United

~tates,

be

held to develop policies which would fall somewhere between

93~ory H.oss, nv~orla • s Bell Tolls," 5aturday H.eview,
36:22, kay 2, 1953 .
94Arthur lvi . ~chlesinger, Jr., A 'l'housand Days,
(tioston: Houghton l1.ifflin Company, l9b5), p. 551.
95Richard P . ~tebbins (ed.}, The United States in
World Affairs, ~(New York: Harper-arid Brothers, 1951),
pp . 256-57.
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"Malanism" ana North African

11

liberalism . u96

Others called

for the United States to heed the call of Portugal for such
a conference, and to develop a consistent policy on Africa
south of the Sahara . 97
American preoccupation was with Britain and her
ability to hold on to her colonial holdings .

One example

of her cooperation with the status guo in East Africa was
the incident involving a man named
student at Lincoln University .

~iUgo

Gatheru, who was a

In September, 1952, an

agent of the United States Justice Department went to
Lincoln University ana questioned Gatheru for four hours.
The student received a letter on November 5, 1952, telling
him that he must leave the country within thirty days or
face aeportation . 98
Gatheru was a student, and simply a student, but the
fear displayed by the british, that those who went abroad
for education woula return to assert their political rights,
seemed to have eroded their sense of propriety .
That the Unitea

~tates

Government allowed itself to be

drawn into the affair in this manner brings into question

96The New York Times , I•1ay 12, 1952, page 3, col . 1 .
97The New York Times, l\'iay 18 , 1952, page 1, col . 3 •
98st . Clair urake, "'l'he 'lerror That 't.alks by Day ,"
Nation, 175:490- 92 , November 29 , 1952 .
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its entire intelligence arrangement as well as its valuation of human freedom .

The Kenya Africans, and their

friends, certainly viewed the matter in this light .
The Kenya autnorities know that l·~ugo is neither
lv1au !•.i.auist or Gor11.rnunist . Are they simply aeterminea that he shall not graduate from Lincoln?
Or could it be that American iu~igration officials
cannot distinguish Gold Coastism from Con~unism
and have ordered I~~ugo deported as H subversive n?
~ugo - son- of -Gatheru is waiting to see whether the
Statue of Lioerty means what he thought it meant . 99
Gatheru had incurrea the suspicion of the British
colonial administration of Kenya because he had once written
a letter asking when Africans would be able to vote .

He had

corresponded with people in America, and in 1948, a group
called the Afro- World Fellowship , obtained a scholarship
for him .

He was not allowed a visa because he was looked

upon as a trouble-maker due to the letter mentioned above . 100
Gatheru ' s subsequent trials in making his way to the
United

~tates

and taking advantage of the opportunity to

study , make interesting reading , both in regard to the
efforts of the british to th\'lart his quest to obtain an
education, and the American official willingness to cooperate with the British in their actions .
As will be shown later , the United States was committed to the support of rlritain because of the strategic
100Ibid .
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importance of East Africa militarily, and it did not take
seriously the nationalist efforts in Africa south of the
Sahara .
East Africa was news .

And, the American public, as

well as the government , took note of the area .

There, in

the far-off jungles, raged the naked passions of primitive
men, with savages stalking the country- side wielding spears
and knives .

Wild animals roamed the plains , elephants

trumpeted, lions roared, leopards screamed , and the hyena
projected his insane laughter through the still nights of
the plains.

Books , movies , magazines , as well as other

communications media emphasized the romance and excitement of a far-away country complete with the atmosphere
of a nineteenth century adventure into the dangerous
frontier.lOl
III •

'l'HE EISENHO\•f,ci;R ERA

General Dwight D. Eisenhower came to the Presidency
of the United States from command of the unified defense
organization in Europe in 1953.

Eisenhower, who had had

no domestic political experience, and who had only a
military orientation in international politics, acceded

10ln5eason for .;afari," Newsweek , 45:78,
February 28 , 1955.
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to the Presidency of the United States with t he attitude
t hat the NATO arrangement was necessar y for the survival
of \~/estern civilization . 102
The Nor th Atlantic Treaty Organization was foremost
in the consider ation of Eisenhower during the latter part
of his military career , and the Atlantic community continued to be his first concern during his tenure .

Par ticu-

larly , when the interests of Europe and Africa came into
conflict, as they did in Kenya in 1952- 56, he consistently
chose to support the col onial powers .

1he problem was

stated in the following manner :
"A central question is how U. s . operations
in Africa relate to , ana what is their effect
on , the colonial interests and administrations
of our NATO allies . 11 103
His policies were always predicated on the premise
of legality , and he was hesitant to offend either the
colonials or those who were coming to power in the newer
states of Africa . l04

However , expediency , with respect to

102Dwight D. Eisenhower , 1~1andate for Change : 1.221-2.§
(Vol . I of The Vfuite House Years . 2 vols . ; Garden City,
New York : Doubleday and Company , 1963) , p . 12 .
103uavid L. Gordon, quoted in Africa Today, C. Grove
Haines, editor (Baltimore : The Johns Hopkins Press , 1955),
p . 449 .
104Richard P . Stebbins (ed . ) , The United States in
Worla Affairs , ~ (New York: Harper ana Brothers, 1953T,
p . 353 .
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the declining capabilities of the British Empire, regularly
won the day in American foreign policy .

The colonies

represented a formidable asset for Britain, and Bisenhower,
with his close ties with

~urope,

knew how desperate Britain

had become in trying to maintain a prominent place in the
government of the world.
The importance of the colonies was spelled out by
Elspeth Huxley in an article written for the magazine,
Foreign Affairs:
It is to Africa that Britain must look for
that field for investment, source of raw materials and expanding market which she needs in
order to survive , and she must win it quickly
from the swamps ana forest and high veld of
the last continent to be pioneered . l05
The article continued to spell out the strategic
importance of Africa for Britain, and forcefully denigrated the abilities of Africans to govern themselves .
Eisenhower, as did Truman before him, consistently
couched his policy statements in terms designed to take
advantage of the American history of revolution, and to
encourage those behind the "iron curtain" to rebel against
their rulers .

A typical statement of policy are these

words, spoken at Columbia University in 1950:

l05Elspeth Huxley, "British Aims in Africa," Foreign
Affairs, 2S:43, October, 1949.
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"The best foreign policy is to live our daily
lives in honesty, decency, and integrity; at
home, making our own land a more fitting habitation for free men; and, abroad, joining with
those of like mind and heart, to make of the
world a place where all men can dwell in
peace . 11 106
However, as President, Eisenhower developed a remarkable affinity for John Foster Dulles, his

~ecretary

of

~tate,

and gave him extensive power to make policy and to determine
action.

It is instructive to note that President

inaugural address made no mention of Africa.l07

~isenhower 1 s

Also, Dulles'

first speech as Secretary of State referred to Africa only
to suggest that trouble there would be because of
Communism.l08
Governmental thought had apparently been influenced
by the opinions of such men as Sir Philip Mitchell, former
Governor of Kenya, who said:
When the British penetrated ~ast Africa its
natives "had no wheeled transport • • • no roads
nor towns • • • no tools • • • They had no means
of writing, even by hieroglyphics, nor of numbering except by their fingers or making notches on
a stick • • • Perhaps most astonishing of all to

106Dwight D. Eisenhower, quoted in The New York Times,
January 13, 1952, page 5, col . 6 .
107Dwight D. Eisenhower, Text of Inaugural Address
quoted in The New York Times, January 21, 1953, page 19.
lOSJohn Foster Dulles, quoted in The New York Times,
January 28, 1953, page S .
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the European mind~ they had no calendar nor
notion of time . 11 1 U9
Africa had erupted in 1952.
l·J.C.U l·J.C.U

Kenya had suffered the

rebellion , which captured the attention of many

Americans .

North Africa began to expe rience the agony of

colonial rebellion as the Arab people expressed their long
suppressed desire to rule themselves once more . 110
Alan Paton, the eminent authority on Africa, wrote:
The white man in Black Africa moves to give
the African what he demands . He is there to
teach, which he does nobly some of the time.
But in the ~outh, he is called on to share
with the African, which is much more difficult
to do .lll
The importance of the movement toward independence
had been emphasized by the American representative on the
United Nations Trusteeship Council when he wrote in 1950:
The policies which we adopt toward the backward areas of Asia and africa will have consequences quite as far- reaching and profound as
will the more spectacular decisions which we
make in the stupendous struggle now raging

109~ir Philip I,.itchell , former Governor of Kenya ,
quoted in "Colonialism ' s Challenge ," Newsweek , 46:40,
October 31 , 1955 .

llQrhe New York Times , January 26, 1952, page 1 .
lllAlan Paton, "Africa, \wakening , Challenges the
•'forld," 'l'he New York Times !~tagazine , July 6, 1952, page 6.
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between ~oviet Russia and the free world. On
their outcome hangs the future of civilization.ll2
Men from the emerging nations also pointed up the
importance of the events in the areas that had been ruled
by colonialism.

Jl·.~.oshe

bharett suggested before the United

Nations that there were two struggles going on in the
world ; one of them was the contest between Last and lest ,
or the "cold war."

"The other--which was to prove equal

if not greater concern to this Assembly--had as its
scene a vast belt of territories in Asia and Africa . ull3
An indication of the airection of United States
policy with regard to Africa generally , and East Africa
specifically , was a controversy which came before the
United Nations in 1952 concerning the summary removal of
a group of Africans , from tribal lands on the slopes of
Mt . Kilimanjaro, to less productive areas.
on resolutions dealing with the

\~ameru

In the voting

removal, the United

States voted with Britain to validate action of the colonial
government of Tanganyika , justifying their actions on the

ll2F . B. Sayre , "lq!uest for Independence ," Foreign
Affairs , 30 :564 , July , 1950 .
ll3I•10she Sharett, quoted in 1'he United States in
World Affairs, 1221, Richard P . Stebbins, editor (New
York: Harper and Brothers , 1952), p . 371 .

49
grounds that it enabled the country to more efficiently
use its land in the production of exportable commodities,
especially coffee . ll4
The United btates was caught in a dilemma .

On the

one hand she had sympathy for those who were trying to overthrow colonialism , but on the other she had to pacify her
partners in the
asserts that,

11

\~estern
•••

defense arrangement .

De Kiewiet

the African policy of the United

States is split down the middle by a stubborn and troublesome contradiction between immediate strategic and
ultimate historic interests . nll5
Paul H. Nitze , former Director of the Policy Planning
btaff of the Department of

~t ate

noted the necessity of a

change of attitude in the men who determined policy with
regard to those areas which were coming to independence :
My former colleague , c . B. karshall, has emphasized the point that the test of a nation ' s great ness is whether it can adjust from a position where
it once disposed to a position where it must deal
with problems . The Spaniards \vere not able to
make that transition successfully and suffered the
consequences . At one time the West disposed with

ll4chadwick Hall, "Colonialism in the United Nations, 11
Nation, 175 : 359, October 18 , 1952 .
115c . \'L De Kiewiet, "African Dilemmas , " Foreign
Affairs , 33 :447, April , 1955 .

50
respect to Africa . Today it is necessary to deal
with Africa . The basic challenge is whether the
West can do this constructively and imaginatively . llo
John Gunther summed up American attitudes toward

~ast

Africa in 1953 with these words :
United ~tates interest in East Africa is not
pronounced . Washington has always thought of
it-- indeed the whole world of the Indian Ocean-as predominantly a british sphere . ll7
\ihat was true of Kenya was also true of the rest of
Africa.

They were looked upon as provinces of the colonial

powers and the United

had no direct interest in

~tates

their internal circumstances .
IV .

TH~

TIDE TURNS

The action of world politics had been moving gradually from the North to the

~outh .

Truman had his first

taste of conflict with Russia in Poland.

As the cold war

wore on events moved slowly southward through the East
European states and into the

J~ddle

East, bringing neces-

sary adaptations of policy and attitudes.

llbPaul H. Nitze quoted in Africa Today, C. Grove
Haines, editor (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955),
p. b5 .

ll7John Gunther, Inside Africa {New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1953), p . 350 .
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President Eisenhower emphasized this change of
arena in his memoirs:
Beginning in the latter months of my first
term and for several years tnereafter, no region
of the worla received as much of my close attention and that of my colleagues as did the
Middle East . ll8
The 1'<1idale Bast crisis of 1956, closely connected
with the Hungarian uprising, marked a turning point in the
entire relationship of the United States with the emerging
nations of the world .
In Egypt, Gamal Abael Nasser had taken over the Suez
Canal in response to a move by

~ecretary

of

~tate

Dulles

cancelling proffered American aid for the Aswan Dam .
Claiming that such a move was necessary in order to pay
for the aam, from the revenues of the canal, Nasser was
able to gain support from Russia and whip the
nations into line . ll9

~iestern

It was a diplomatic coup for Nasser

and for Russia .

ll8.L)wight D. Eisenhower, \~aging Peace : 1.2.2.£- bl (Vol .
II of The white House Years . 2 vols . ; Garden City, New
York: Doubleaay and Company, 19b5), p. 20 .
ll9samuel .tUiot l•lOrison, The Oxford History of the
American People (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965T,
p. 1095 .
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The President himself indicated the reason for
United States temporizing in the Suez crisis:
vle could not permit the ~oviet Union to seize
the leadership in the struggle against the use of
force in the hiddle East and thus win the confidence of the new indepenaent nations of the world.
But on the other hand l by no means wanted the
British and French to be branded as naked aggressors without provocation . I therefore instructed
Foster to draft two statements : an announcement
of our suspension of all military and some governmental economic aid to Israel; and a moderate resolution for submission to the General Assembly in
an effort to block a resolution-- certain to be an
objectionable one --by the boviet Union . l20
Dulles apparently: did not believe, prior to Suez,
that Egypt could manage the seizure of the canal from
Britain and France, or operate it .

But, with Russia on

the verge of gaining the complete confidence of t he Arab
nations, and thereby threatening to extend her absolute
influence beyond Europe into the strategically important
areas of the Miadle East, the United

~tates

had to act to

retain the trust of the newly independent nations, saving
some semblance of 11Iestern influence in all these important
areas .
Nasser's success brought a new assessment of the
emerging nations by the United States , especially in Africa .
In a conversation with Nehru of India, the timeliness of a

1 20Eisenhower, Waging Peace: ~- bl, p .

83 .
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policy change was underscored .

The United

~tates

must now

act in a direct relationship with the emerging nations in
order to salvage Western influence in those countries.
Nehru talked to the President about nationalism as related
to the two power groups of the world:
This woula be a propitious moment, he suggested,
because of the blunder of the Soviets in Hungary,
for the Free ~·/orld to move to strengthen the
faith and hope of those who would like to live in
independence but who have been misled, at least
partly, by Communist doctrine . l21
The realization that Africa was progressing inexorably
toward independence and that the colonial powers were losing
their positions there haa finally dawned upon the American
administration .

This, coupled with a puritanical obsession

with the American role of leadership, led the President and
his advisors to revise their estimates of, and policies
toward, the African nationalists .

President Eisenhower

commented:
The United ~tates was not directly involved,
for we had no territorial claims in Africa. But ,
with a position of leadership in the Free ~o rld,
we did not want to see chaos run wild among hopeful, expectant peoples and could not afford to
see turmoil in an area where the Communists would
be only too delighted to take an advantage. In
spite of the relatively high regard in which the
United ~tates was held in most of the newly
emerging nations because of our anti-colonial
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tradition , our close alliances with some of the
former colonial powers caused vexing complications in Africa . l22
The Unitea

~tates

began to search for a policy which

would allow it to be connected with both the old colonial
powers and the new nations as they took their places in
the coWlcils of the world .

Vernon lvLcKay wrote in 1957

about the developing political awareness in Tanganyika,
when Julius Nyerere , a teacher from the Lakes Region of
that Trust Territory , began to organize the nation for
independence . 123

l•1cKay' s comment on the efforts of the

United States to evolve a policy is pertinent and incisive :
The policy which has come out of these deliberations is veiled in ambiguity and expressed in
generalities that have lost their glitter, but
its essence is that the United States supports
the goal of self- government or inde pendence for
all peoples who have the desire and the capacity
to maintain it . In government circles t his is
called a balanced or middle- of- the- road policy
of constructive moderation . The public calls it
f ence - sitting . There is an element of truth in
both descriptions . l24
Eisenhower sent Vice-President Nixon on a trip to
Africa in 1957 , se eking some light on the conditions there

l22rbid ., p . 572 .
l23vernon lv1cKay , nToo Slow or Too Fast, n Foreign
Affairs , 35 : 303, July , 1957 .
l 2 4rbid . , p . 307 .
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and looking for ways to maintain the ambivalent policy which
had been pursued for so long .

His report to the President
was presented on april 7, 1957 . 12 5
However, Nixon's trip did not bring him into meaningful contact with the forces of nationalism in southern Africa.
'l'he United Press made the follo\'ling comment on his itinerary:
Apart from a brief stop in Uganda, ~~. Nixon
had no opportunity to examine the tensions
associatea with political ana economic growth
in those African countries that stood lower
down on the timetable of inaependence . l26
Perhaps the most meaningful action taken by the United
~tates

in the post - war years, in relation to Africa , was the

creation of the Bureau of African Affairs .

This action was

taken in the latter part of 1957 and marked a significant
step forward in the relationships of the United btates with
the area of Africa south of the Sahara . l 2 7
Surprising and enlightening is the comment of Arthur
M.

~chlesinger,

Jr .

as he reviewed the establishment of

the Africa Bureau, that in 1957 there were still more

125Paul E . Zinner (ed . ), Documents££ American Foreign
Relations, 1957 (New York : Harper and Brothers, 1958),
pp . 5 et seqq .
126Richard P . Stebbins (ed . ) , The United ~tates in
World Affairs, 1221 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958T,
p . 201 .
127~chlesinger, loc . cit .
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Foreign bervice functionaries in \Jest Germany than in all
of the countries of Africa . l28
But , the establishment of the Bureau did not alter
the attituaes of those who determined United States policy .
In commenting on the course of Africa toward independence,
Joseph Palmer, II, Assistant becretary for African Affairs ,
remarked:
"It is , of course , a matter of the greatest
importance that the word 'orderly' be emphasized
in this connection . It is axiomatic that membership in the family of nations carries with it
responsibilities to the group . It is a matter
of vital importance that this be known and
accepted by the emerging peoples . In the long
run , premature independence may contain as many
dangers for Africa and Africans as the denial
of that status . "129
But, the establishment of the Bureau was a needed step
to remedy the problem faced by the United States in communi eating with the Africans .

State officials now recognized

that Africa should receive the same attention as other
geographical areas of the world . 1 3°
American commitment to qualified independence continued through the latter years of the 1950's .

1 28Ibid .
129Joseph Palmer, II, quoted by Henry L . bretton in
African Indepentience, Peter Judd, editor (New York : Dell
Publishing Company , 1962) , p . 447 .
130Paul E . Zinner (ed . ) , Documents on American
Foreign Relations, l2i2 (New York: Harper and Hrothers,
l9b0) , p . 40b .
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3ecretary of State Herter reiterated the conviction that
careful preparation for independence should precede the
granting of self- government to the colonies . l31

Yet , Herter

also went forwara to a new position when he remarked:
"Political advancement in the non- self- governing
and trust territories of Africa is a tribute to the
imagination , good will, and skill of the peoples of
those territories and of the powers that administer
them . It is also a tribute to the encouragement
and assistance given by the United Nations and the
specialized agencies to the advancement of these
territories . 11 132
Africa had not occupied the attention of American
diplomatic concern pr ior to the crisis of 1956, because
it was considered to be both beyond the bounds of proper
involvement by the United States, and because it was
thought to be out of the arena of the cold war . l33
However , the events of 1956 and 1957, the Lebanon
crisis bringing the assertion of the Eisenhower Doctrine,
injected nev1 elements into the international consciousness .
Until that time, the !VJ.iddle Bast was considered relatively
free from the influence of the Soviet Union .

But, the

13lchristian Herter, quoted in Documents 0n American
Foreign Relations, !222, Paul g . Zinner , editor TNew York:
Harper and Brothers, 19b0), p . 37 .
132Ibid.
133henry L. Bretton, "United ~tates Foreign Policy
Toward the Newly Inaependent ::>tates,n African Independence,
Peter Judd, editor (New York : Dell ~ublishing Gompany,
1962), p . 448 .
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series of happenings in those years indicated both the
continued interest of Russia in the

I~ida.le

East and the

willingness of the newly independent states to cooperate
with them.
Indeed, for many years the foreign policy of the
United States had been dictated by simple reaction to
Russian action . l34
Constant reference to

~oviet

initiative is made by

the top echlon of American policy makers .
Unaer- ~ecretary

In January, 1959,

of State Douglas Dillon made the following

comment on policy considerations of the United States:
nrro meet the Soviet challenge and to give
reality to our own effort to help the people
of the newly developing nations in their
attempts to fight their way out of the bitter
slavery of poverty, ignorance , and aisease,
we must marshall all the peaceful tools of
trade and aid available to us .nl35
American relations with African states are pointed up
by dealings with

~ekou

Toure of Guinea, when in 1958 he

defied De Gaulle's attempt to cement the French international

134Richard P . ~tebbins (ea . ), !he United States in
World Affairs , ~ (New York: Harper and Brothers, 19521',
p.

406 .

135nouglas Dillon, quoted in Documents 2£ American
Foreign Helations , ~' Paul E. Zinner , editor (New York :
Harper ana Brothers , 1960), p . 142 .
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community with binding ties .

"Toure turned to the East,

secured anns from Czechoslovakia .

Then the United

acted, but only tentatively and niggardly . nl36

~tates

This

reactionary policy by the United States said to the African
states that, " • • • we were not interested in Africa,
except as a cold war bastion •

..

•

ul37

The ambivalent attitude of the United
dictated by the complex mixture of

~ estern

~tates

was

alliances,

domestic idealism, economic interests , and the felt necessity to counter the actions of the Communists . l38
V.

THE CHAI'vG.r..D DEFJ!.NSE

PO~'l'UltE

One final element of the policy decisions of the
Eisenhower Administration is to be noted in the virtual
destruction of Western defense arrangements in the Middle
Bast, or, at least, the aanger of such disruption .
Dulles had attempted to surround the
with a ring of defensive alliances .
the first of these treaties .

~oviet

Union

'l'he NATO alliance was

This was followed by the

:::>outheast Asia 1'reaty Organization, designed to thwart any

l36Hretton, ££ • cit ., p . 451 .
l37rbid .
l38Ibid . , p. 446 .
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Communist attempt to break out of the ring thrown around
Communist states from Japan to Pakistan .
the

~addle

But, the area of

East, particularly with the events of l95b,

indicated a decided weakness in that area .

As one military

man commented :
The loss of the ~.1iadle E.ast would, if it
included Egypt, give the enemy access to the
African continent by land . The way then would
lie open to thrusts westward along the North
African coast and southward into the Sudan
and through Ethiopia . The prize along the
latter route would be British East Africa and
South Africa • • • \ve would then have the
Soviet Union at our own doorstep, the control
of the Atlantic challenged and South America
threatened • • • This is the nightmare that,
in the years to come, we must prevent, either
in whole or in part , ever becoming reality . l39
This analysis by Admiral Richard L. Conolly, indicated the seriousness with which the United

~tates

the events in the Iviiddle East in l95b and 1957 .

viewed

He indi-

cated that the United States considered British and French
plans for defense of the continent to be inadequate and
suggests the extent of those plans in the heart of Africa .
He suggests that the departure of Britain from the 1'<1iddle

l39Richard L. Conolly, "Africa ' s ~trategic ~ignifi
cance," Africa 'l'oday , C. Grove Haines , editor {Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins Press , 1955), p . 62.

61
East left that front line virtually defenseless and the
second line inadequately prepared .
In the case of the British, the defense in
depth extended from Palestine, where they aid
have a considerable number of troops (although
in a politically precarious position), thence
back through the Suez Canal, ~gypt , and the
~udan.
It was finally to be based on British
East Africa, where a new Britain overseas was
envisaged . This development apparently was to
include new military--and naval- base facilities
that woula provide for the possible loss of
buez . l40
~viaently,

the \fest ern Allies viewed the impending

exit of Britain and France from positions of dominance in
the

~1iddle

,ri;ast with grave concern.

Efforts were made to effect an alliance of those new
states of the lv.liadle Bast which would deny Russia access to
that area and which would make for security of lines of
communication with sources of supply in Africa, as well as
staging areas for possible troop movements threatening the
\'/estern Hemisphere .
~ast

Africa was central in the plans of the Allies

to draw an effective line of defense farther south in East
and Central Africa . l41
Clearly, if the aefensive posture of the

~:e stern

Allies was to be maintained, new relationships needed to be

1 4°Ibid . , pp . 57-58 .

1 41 Ibia . , p. bl .
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formed with the emerging nations .

The Baghdad Pact even-

tually was formed to be the basis of retention of the
Middle East as the first line of defense . 1 4 2
Because of the urgency of the defensive consideration ,
the United

~tates

began to renovate its official relations

with the new states .
tion of the
of

~tate

~ureau

Thus , the significance of the forma -

of African Affairs within the Department

is clarified .

The ola policy of Secretary Dulles had insisted on
an absolute adherence to one side or the other in the cold
war .

Further, he injected into the American mind the con-

viction that those who were neutral were taking an immoral
position . l43
However , with the vain effort in 1957 to persuade the
Africans to line up with the United 3tates in the cold war,
a search was begun for more workable policies regarding the
African states , precisely because of the strategic importance of certain parts of that continent to defense
arrangements . l44

142Eisenhower, Mandate for Change :
143 ~c
, hl es~nger
.
, ££•

"t

~. ,

!22l-2£,

p . 574 .

p . 506 •

144Hichard P . Stebbins (ed . ), Documents 2n American
Foreign Relations, 1960 (New York: Harper ana ~rothers,
1961), p . 165 .
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VI.

ElS~NHOW~R

ANL

DULL~~

General Eisenhower constantly iterated American
idealism, speaking about sucn matters as freedom, selfdetermination, economic progress, and all the things men
speak of when talking in generalities.

Indeed, one perti-

nent criticism of Americans is that they have consistently
refused to recognize the reality of the circumstances of
the world when they have uttered platitudes regarding freedom, plenty, liberty or other ideals .

And, the policy of

the United btates remained that of maintaining the status
guo, which vitiated all the idealism expressed by the
leaders of the country . 1 45 Henry L . Bretton said:
It is not suggested that there existed in
United ~tates official circles no genuine devotion to humanitarian principles or a real commitment to freedom and human dignity . \~bat
matters here is that, by its own preference
and in the face of prevailing domestic and
international political pressures, the United
~tates government over the years has lagged
behind not only the boviet advocates of anticolonialism, but even the colonial powers
themselves . For in London, Paris ana Brussels
the need for substantial reform and change was
being recognized while United ~tates officials
still insisted on stability and observance of
"law ana order . "l46

l45Bretton, ££· cit., p. 451.
146Ibid . , p. 448.
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VII •

'l'HE

KENN~DY

COURTSHIP

Developments in the politics of nations after 1lorld
War II made it inevitable that the United

~tates

woula be

increasingly occupied with matters relating to Africa in
the second half of the twentieth century.l47
Accordingly, an increased interest in the continent
arose throughout the American populace.

~very

phase of the

American nation was attracted to the area that had been
neglected for so long .

This interest became increasingly

apparent in the election campaign of 1960, and in the year
immediately preceding it.l4S
American change of attitude toward Africa was part
of a larger revision which encompassed all the unaerdeveloped nations of the worla.

Arthur lVl . :::,chlesinger, Jr .

has commented: "Of the various transformations wrought in
the Kennedy years none was less noted or more notable than
the revolution in American attitudes toward the uncowaitted
world.nl49

l47Richard P. Stebbins (ea.), The United btates in
World Affairs, ~ (~ew York: Harper and Brothers, 1959T,
p. 240.
l48Paul E . Zinner (ea . ), Documents on American
Foreign Relations, !222 (New York: Harper and brotners ,
l9bO), p. 414.
l49~chlesinger, QQ . cit., p . 507.

65
John F . Kennedy had been a member of the

~enate

Foreign Relations Committee and had been Chairman of the
African Subcommittee .

In that capacity he called attention

to the vital changes that were taking place in the newly
developing countries , and focused the concern of the United
States on the problems of Africa to an extent now known
before . 1 5°
vuring the campaign of 1960, Kennedy made 479 references to Africa in his speeches . l51

Appropriate indeed was

the development that the candidate who knew most about the
continent came to the Presidency in that crucial year .
However , Kennedy could not overcome the inertia of
years of policy developed in previous administrations.
And, as a matter of fact , the Kennedy Admi nistration
endorsed the policy of the previous administration . 1 52
Although the new President and his close advisors
wished to revise the policy of the Unitea States, they had
to consider first those who had obtained, through long years
of association, positions of power and influence i n the
President ' s party .l53

Thus, in the 1960's there

l5°Ibid ., p . 554 .

15 1 rbid .

1)2Bretton , ££• ~ ., p . 459 .
153~chlesinger ,

££· cit., p . 509 .
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emerged the necessity to slowly and carefully revise the
attitudes of gove rnment in policy matters .
and tedious task .

'l'his is a long

As the Council on Foreign Relations

not.ed :
Ev en in l9bl, Africa retained a certain novelty
as an area of American concern, and American policy
there continued to be marked by a spirit of origi nality and, at times, of frank experimentation . l54
Few in the United

~tates

that Kennedy had s hown in his

shared the concern for Africa

~enate

tenure, and the Senate

Subcommittee lapsed into inaction when Senator Gore resigned
from the chairmanship in 1963 .155
As the new administration began its formidable task
in 1960, at the height of the Congo crisis, Kennedy appointed
G. l-'1ennen \IJilliams to the sensitive post of Assistant Sec retary for African Affairs, the first appointment he made
in the Department of State .

In making the appointment he

remarked that it was a position of highest importance in
the administration . l56

154Richard P . ~teboins (ea . ), The United ~tates in
World Affairs, 1961 (New York : Harper and Brothers, 1962T,
p . 234 .
155~chlesinger, 2£• cit . , p . 557 .

156rbid . , p . 555 .
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Also worthy of note is the assertion of O:,chlesinger
that because of the sensitivity of Africans to racial
difficulties within the country, Kennedy was persuaded to
remove the name of Senator William Fulbright from the list
of possible appointees as Secretary of ~tate . 1 57
As is true throughout the post - war years, the iaealism
of the United

~tates,

at least in public statements meant

for the ears of foreign diplomats, served to heighten the
feeling among African nationalists that the United

~tates

and African nations shar ed the same goals .
By promoting an image of an identity of goals
between the American and African revolutions,
through repeated references to such terms as
"freedom, 11 "democracy," "liberty," invocations
of the words of the American founding fathers
and so on, the American public was being subjected to a massive misrepresentation . l)B
Many public figures were affected by the aesire to
win the Africans to our side in the cold war , and they missed
few opportunities to make it clear that Africa and the United
States shared the same anti- colonial desires .
Kennedy felt that the new nations of Africa and Asia
were the new field of operations in the conflict between
democracy and Communism and that a new policy of recognition

l57Ibid . , p . 140
15BBretton, QE • cit ., p . 46b .
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and respect for the neutrals was most likely to win their
cooperation in the international councils of nations . 1 59
Consequently, when Liberia placed before the Security
Council of the United Nations, in February, 1961, a resolution calling for Portugal to comply with the United Nations'
policy against colonialism and proposing an inquiry into
the Angola circumstances, Kennedy took the opportunity to
indicate a change of American policy . lbO
Although the resolution failed in the

~ecurity

Council, the United States had projected a new image, and
would not thereafter be automatically thought of as an
advocate of co1onialism . l6l

It was a tentative stand,

but one designed to say that the Americans were taking a
position somewhat removed from those

~uropean

Allies who

had been so determinative of her attitudes in the post- war
world .
An incident which points up the importance attached

to the new policy towards Africa occurred in 1961 .

G.

~ennen

Williams was making one of his frequent trips to Africa, and
made an unfortunate reference in favor of "Africa for the
Africans . n

Of course a howl of protest went up, since the

l59~ch1esinger, QE· cit . , p . 507 .

160rbid ., p . 512 .

l61Bretton, QQ . cit . , p. 4bl .
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statement was made in Nairobi, Kenya, the stronghold of
British settlers.
to uphold the

President Kennedy thought it expedient

~ecretary

and gave his endorsement to a

qualification made by ~Jilliams .162
Such an incident served the purpose of shifting
United States policy from that of automatic support of
European nations allied in the various defense arrangements
to that of a uni-lateral policy which would take into consideration all facets of the world situation in making
policy .
American policy toward Africa was stated by
\lilliams in a Department of State Bulletin in Iv1arch, 1964,
which was an extension of the policy received by the
Johnson Administration at the unfortunate demise of
President Kennedy:
In recent years governmental assistance has
been addea to private efforts to help meet Africa 's
neeas. We are now assisting African nations
through such organizations as the Peace Corps,
the Agency for International Development , the
~xport-Import Bank ; through exchange programs
and scholarships: and through our contributions
to international organizations.lb3

162a. Mennen Williams , quoted in The United States in
\'lorld Affairs , 1961, Richard P. Stebbins , editor (l'lew York :
Harper and Brothers, 1962), p . 247 .
163a. 1•1ennen Williams, "Promising Trends in Africa , 11
Department of ~tate Bulletin , 50:3 73, l·1arch 9, 1964.
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Although concern for Africa increased during
Kennedy ' s years in office, the many tasks of governing did
not allow him to focus his attention on the continent .
However,

~chlesinger

points out that :

• • • his curiosity v.ras unremitting . He cared
very much, for example, about the performance
of his African ambassadors and rarely failed to
see them when they came home on consultation .l64
The United

~tates

was preoccupied with other problems

of the world to a greater extent than with Africa .

The

annals of foreign policy repeatedly indicate that the United
States could not afford to maintain a policy that would
vitiate the positions of her European Allies .
aictated that the United

~tates

Practicality

not destroy their power

precipitately . lb5
It could be said that in a world where the
warning sirens are constantly shrieking in one
corner or another , africa has still not become
enough of a danger point to command full
American attention .lbb
To this point, at least, Africa has not demanded as
urgent a consideration as other areas.

Consequently , she

remains on the fringe of United btates interest .

lb4schlesinger, oo . cit . , p . 55b .
l65Rupert Emerson , "'l'he Character of American Interests in Africa , " in The United States and Africa, ~lalter
Golaschmidt, eaitor (New York : irederick A. Praeger, l9o3),
p . 25 .

lb6Ibid .

CHAPI'ER IV
THE UNI'l'ED STATES AND EAC>T AFRICAN IDEAS
Semantics makes personal
art .

~fuether

con~unication

a difficult

they are differences involved in dialects

within a country, or the more hopeless efforts of communicating between languages, one must have respect for the
problem of determining the meaning of words .
After Uorld War II, the matter of conununications
assumed an even greater gravity.

Although Stalin may have

talked about democracy, the word conveyed an entirely different concept to him tnan to Truman .

belf- aetermination

was also much talked about, but it meant different things
to Truman and Jomo Kenyatta .
Differences in concepts may account for many of the
seeming deviations from idealisms which were expressed by
Africans and Westerners alike .

vfuen 'lruman spoke of self-

determination, or democracy, or freedom, or some other word
in the Western vocabulary, those words did not necessarily
mean the same things to nationalists in Africa, who were
intent upon achieving for themselves the privilege of
self- rule .
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I .

THE I.-IEANING OF ID.t.:OLOGY

For the purposes of this study, the following definition of ideology, given by Joseph S. Nye, Jr., will be
used:
Ideology is a set of value- related beliefs
which are at least partly systematized . The
three necessary components of an ideology are
beliefs, values, and system (interdependence) .
Values account for action orientation and
commitment associated with ideology . l67
Within the framework of this definition, all peoples
are capable of ideology .

No matter how primitive their

culture, it is based on a set of values, and is systematized , therefore it is an ideology .
While tnere are men who would deny that Africans are
capable of such sophistication, they are few at the present
time .

However, in the years preceding the attainment of

independence by African countries , such men were not only
numerous, they were influential .

Bstimates such as that of

bir Philip lv1itchell , once Governor of Kenya, to whom reference was made on page forty- six, reflect the conviction that
Africans are not capable of ideology .
A similar statement may be found in the article
written by Margery Perham, who often has been quoted as an

lb7Joseph S . Nye, Jr . , Pan-Africanism and East
African Integration (Cambridge, l•1assachusetts : Harvard
University Press, 1965), p . 29 .
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expert on African affairs.

In aefending the British

against the criticisms of Americans regarding their colonial
policies, she uses the words "backwaraness , n nuncivilizea,u
"semi- civilized," "unproductive , n nunorganized , " ana other
similar words to aescribe the accomplishments of the
Africans before the British came upon the scene . l68
II .

WES'l'ERN

PltON0UNC.&•lE~'l' S

From the inception of the Atlantic Charter, to the
present , statements poured from the lips of Western leaders
that whetted the appetites of African nationalists .
Arthur k .

~chlesinger ,

Jr . says,

"~ince

the time of

Franklin ltoosevelt American policy had had a nominal commitment to anti - colonialism . nl69
Truman, on numerous occasions, talked of the right of
self- determination for all peoples .

His pronouncement in

asserting the 'l'ruman Doctrine, gave hope to all those in
Africa as well as those of the Miadle East .

In his memoirs,

1681\'largery Perham, "African Facts ana American Criticisms," Foreign Affairs , 22:444 , April, 1944 .
169Arthur t-'i . Schlesinger , Jr ., A Thousand Days
{Boston: Houghton t-.ifflin Company, l9b5T, p . 5IO:'"
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the President said, "I still believed in \'ioodrow \'lilson 1 s
philosophy of

1

self - determination . 1 ul70

Also, after the

meeting of Truman anu Attlee in December, 1950, their final
communique committed both to certain principles :
It reaffirmed that the objectives of our two
nations were the same; namely, to maintain world
peace and respect for the rights and interests of
all peoples, to promote strength and confidence
among the freedom- loving countries of the world,
to eliminate the causes of fear, want, ana discontent, and to advance the democratic way of
life . l71
President Eisenhower also seemed to place the United
States on the side of the Africans when he made his trip to
Africa in 1959 .

He later stated :

I believe that our talks, formal and informal,
helped to persuade national leaders and millions
of people that the United States had no selfish
purpose in cooperating with them; that we sought
no territory; did not wish to dominate ; and
believed in freely chosen governments for peoples
and nations everywhere . l72
Eisenhower seemed to be on safe ground at the time,
for he did not envisage the possibility of any new

l7~arry s. Truman, ~' Year of Decisions (New
York: bignet Books, 1955), p . 306.
1 71Harry S . Truman, 1916-.2£, Years of Trial and Hope
(New York : bignet Books, 1956 , p. 467 .
172.uwight D• .t:isenhower, \~aging Peace, J:2i£- 61
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1965),
p . 512 .
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African countries coming to independence, and he was
supported by his Secretary of ~tate, John Foster uulles . l73
The independence march gained ground in 1960, and
forced Eisenhower to reassess the rapidity with which
African nations were advancing toward their goal .

On

September 20, 1960, he addressed the General Assembly of
the United Nations and proposed in part:
• • • a pledge by all countries represented at
this Assembly to respect the African peoples'
right to choose their own way of life and to aetermine for themselves the course they choose to
follow • • • . 174
John F . Kennedy brought youth and vitality to the
Presidency .

He too pronounced the commitment of the United

States to the principles of independence and self- aetermination .

An example is his speech in Independence Hall,

Philaaelphia, Pennsylvania on July 4, 19o2, in which he
stated :
"The theory of independence, as old as man
himself, was not invented in this hall, but it
was in this hall that the theory became a
practice, that the word went out to all the
world that 'the God who gave us life gave us
liberty at the same time .' 11 175

173rbid., p . 370 .

l74rbid., p . 579 .

l75John F . Kennedy, quoted in The Burden and the
Allan Nevins, editor (New York: Harper ana Row,
l9o4), p . 110 .
~'
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Kennedy, perhaps more than any other leader in the
post - \';ar years, gave the impression that the United ::>tates
sympathized with the aspirations of the African nationalists
in their search for identity ana self- government .

Below are

some of the apparent differences between African and
American thought.
III •

'I'H1 COLD

\~AR

Nothing was more on the minds of American officials
than the contest between the United
Union .

~tates

ana the Soviet

Beginning in the waning days of \Wrla War II and

continuing to the present, it has claimed all elements of
policy for its own, giving no area of state relationships
freedom from its demands .

~chlesinger

gives the following

assessment of the polarization of the world ana its effects
on policy under Dulles:
In the 1950 r s John .f.i' oster Dulles haa trans muted this from an assumption into a dogma . The
Dulles world rested on unitary conceptions of
the opposing blocs: on the one hand, the Hfree
world," capaciously defined to include such
places as Spain, Paraguay, batista 's Cuba and
lvdssissippi and destined ultimately for the
private enterprise of the ~ecretary of Commerce
ana tne god of the ~ecretary of ~tate; and, on
the other the ncommunist camp ," a monolithic
conspiracy with headquarters in l~J.oscow, enslaving
captive peoples and orchestrating global crises
according to a comprehensive master plan . l?b
17b~chlesinger, 2£· cit ., p . 506 .
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Dulles insisted that the struggle between the
continental powers was one of moral systems and that it
was a struggle for continued existence of the right way
of life .

Consequently, he insisted that to be neutral

in the struggle was to be immoral .
Further, in January, 1953, Dulles commented that the
Communists sought to incite natives to revolt against the
Western

~uropeans

in their fight for independence .

He thus

directly injected the cold war issue into the future relations between the United States and the African states . l77
Dulles fully thought that Russia was gaining much
prestige in Africa, especially in Kenya, where the l\1au Mau
rebellion was raging at the moment .

However, a week before

Dulles made his statement, C. 1 . Sulzberger had written in
1he -New York
-- Times:
-.-;;.--..,-.

Communism as an ideological force is not yet
widely understood in Africa . But, as one Negro
remarked to this writer , "If people call it
Communism every time we try to help ourselves,
it causes many of us to think there must be
something ~ood in it."l78

177John Foster Dulles, quoted in The New York Times,
January 28, 1953, page 8 .

l78c . 1 . Sulzberger, dispatch from Capetown, South
Africa for The New York Times, January 18, 1953, page 3.
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An African opinion was expressed by Tom Mboya, the
Kenya politician, who said that " • . • many parts of Asia
and inaependent Africa have remained neutral in the ideological struggle between East and ~·lest . ul79

He said simply

that Africans preferred to be listed as "don ' t know" in
the poll of world opinion .
The cola war was injected into the relations with
Africa .

American officials felt that they could not ais-

count the influence Russia was apparently developing in the
continent, especially after the Afro- Asian Conference of
1957 to wnich the Russians and Chinese were invited . lSO
Coincidentally, 1957 was the year of the formation
of the African Bureau in the Department of btate .
It seems that there was a lack of common understanding about the substance of the cold war .

The United

~tates

viewed it as encompassing all the world in a titanic struggle which would see the emergence of one strong power dominating all the rest .

The Africans tended to view it as

l79Tom J . 1~1boya , Freedom ~ After (Lonaon : Andre
Deutsch, Limited, 1963), p . 235 .
lSONews item in The New York 'l'imes, December 26,
1957, page 4.
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a struggle between two supremely strong nations in which
the smaller nations could not afford to participate directly.
But , it has been suggestea that the rivalry of the
United States and

~ussia,

lately also China, has been the

"sinews" of African diplomacy .

They have pitted the two

large powers against one another, playing a dangerous game .
Were it not for the existence and rivalry of the large
powers, African nations would have no leverage at all in
their diplomacy . l81
IV •
The Unitea
estima~ed

AFRICAN NA'l I GNALISl·i

~tates

often seems to have incorrectly

the nature ana strength of the nationalist

movement in Africa .
One mistake was to view the African pronouncements
as reflecting a

~oviet

line of thought simply because they

sounded soffiewhat like the propaganda emanating from l·ioscow .
The Africans were militant, non-aligned, socialistic, and
had similar methods, goals and terms of reference . l$2

l81R. \'L Howe , "China as tne '!rump in African Pack ,"
New Republic, 151:16, September 5, l9b4.
l8 2Henry 1 . bretton , "United ~tates Foreign Policy
'l'oward the Newly Independent States," African f..pdependence,
Peter Judd, editor (New York : J.Jell Publishing Company,
1962), p . 449.
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Because the Africans sounded much like Moscow in their
attacks on the Western Europeans in Afr ica , American policy
was formed on the assumption that this was true .
'l'he national movement began in 1944 as a study group .
In 194b it became the Kenya African Union , and James Gichuru
was the first president .

Jomo Kenyatta returned to Kenya

in 1947, after years of residence in Britain and travel to
other places, including 1>'1oscow , ana was made president of
the henya African Union . l83
'l'he

l~.~.au

Iv1au uprising began in 1948 and the government

banned numerous organizations , which were promptly replaced
by new ones .

By 1953 an article in Commonweal described the

armed state of the settlers in Kenya, and held Jomo Kenyatta
responsible.l84
The fear of many was that Mau Mau was an extension of
Russia ' s design to foment rebellion in colonial areas in order
to benefit by the confusion . l85

And, it is true that some

native organizations in Kenya were approvea by the Hussians .
'l'he mistake of the United States was to confuse the voice of
183George Bennett , "East and Central Africa , n African
I ndependence, Peter Judd , editor (New York : Dell Publishing
Company, l9b2), p . 39b .
184nJomo Kenyatta , " Commonweal, 58:407- 08 ,
July 31, 1953 .
185The New York Times, January 28, 1953, page 7 .
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Afr ican nationalism with that of
to harmonize .

l~iosc ow

when they happened

Cyri l Bryner, writing in Current History at

the time said :
But ~ov iet approval has never been permanent
endorsement . It is difficult to distinguish in
many native leaders of these regions whether
they are talking with the voice of lvLoscow or
of the London School of Economics. I n any cas e,
they speak in very personal voices . l86
By comparing the voices of the nationalists with that
of 1v1oscow, the United States missed many nuances that might
have been heard there .

An article in Nation, written in

December, 1953, contained one of those notes of despair .
~lizabeth

E. Hoyt quotes a Kenya student :

"Help to get education for the Kikuyu • • •
Help to spread understanding of the tensions
that torment us . You coula find a way to do
that without offending anybody, perhaps by
s peaking through the United Nations . Those
a r e the important things because they are the
foundation of everything else . nl87
It was reported to The New York 'l'imes by C. L.
Sulzberger that there was little

Cor.~unism

in Africa gener-

ally, and he stated, " • . • it is also true of Kenya,

l86cyril Bryner, "Russia and Kenya," Current History,
25:45, July, 1953 .
lB7Elizabeth B. Hoyt, "Dark Road in Kenya , " Nation,
175:550, December 13, 1962, quoting an anonymous Kenya
student .
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where the 1•1au t.1au terrorists are giving the British colonial government a great deal of trouble
But, the United

~tates

nl88

temporized in the case of

Kenya, giving support to the British because the United
States believed that,

n •••

where there is revolutionary

smoke there must be Communist fire.nl89
The substance of this policy was an ambivalence,
which tried to retain the respect of both the British and
the nationalists .
The answer must be one that meets the needs
of the black African and allays the fears of his
white countryman; that gives the black what he
is entitled to as a human being without depriving the white African of his status . l90
American experience in relation to Tanganyika was
happier, probably because the circumstance was vastly
different, in that Tanganyika was a 'l'rusteeship 'l'erritory,
mandated to Britain under the League of Nations, and renewed
under the United Nations, giving the worla body a strong
voice in the administration of the territory .

The United

l88c . L. Sulzberger, dispatch from Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia for 'l'he Nevi York 'l'imes, 22:3, December 23, 1952 .
l89rbia.
l90nAtlantic heport on the World Today," Atlantic,
l9b:4, December, 1955 .
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States was given a place on the 1rusteeship Council , making
it airectly involved in the development of Trusteeships .
However, in 1952 , the United States voted to sustain
the colonial government of 1'anganyika in the action
aepriving the Wameru tribe of ancestral lands . l91
The 1anganyika African National Union was organized
by Julius Nyerere in 1954, out of the old Tanganyika
African Association . l92
1'he report of the Visiting

~dssion

of the Trusteeship

Council in late 1954 estimated that Tanganyika would be able
to gain self- government " • • • within the present generation on the basis of a political time- table . nl93
The question of self- government was raised again vlithin the Council during 195 5 and l'-1' ason Sears, United ::,tates'
Representative , sided with Britain's view that a target date
should not be set .

The final vote was three favoring adop-

tion of the report, two rejecting it, and seven abstentions .
Russia was one of those who abstained . l94

191Resolution No. 648 presented to the United Nations
General Assembly on December 10 , 1952, quoted in The United
States and vlorld Affairs, ~' Richard P . Stebbins, editor
(New-rork: Harper and Brothers, 1953), p . 364 .
192nAfrica: ~fuo is Safe?n Time , 83:30, Iv1arch 13 , 1964.
l93united Nations Review, 1:39, l•1arch, 1955 .
194United Nations Review, 1:65, l•1ay, 1955 .
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But, the weight of the Trusteeship Council was
supporting the Africans, and in 1958 Africans were given
representation in the Legislative Council of the Tanganyika Governrnent . l95
'l'ANU, the political party of Nyerere , was well organizea by that time , and it was being financed to the extent
that it then had a fleet of ten Land- Rover automobiles and
had some eight hundred officials receiving salaries . l9b
Tanganyika achiev ed independence in 1961, and at
that time maintained the best of relationshi ps with the
United States .
Uganda and Zanzibar were special entities which
alreauy had highly developed governmental boaies .

When

they came to the point of indepenaence, it was merely a
matter of the withdrawal of the British from the physical
domain .

Thus, the United States was not faced with the

problems which she faced in regard to Kenya and Tanganyika .
In those countries she had to decide whether she would
support the establishment of governments where there had
never been governments, while in Uganda and Zanzibar, the
governmental units had existed prior to British control .

195United Nations Review, 5:42, May, 1959 .
196Nye, 2E · cit ., p . 101 .
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'l'he latter 1950's saw the United ::>tates change from
a policy which recognized British sovereignty over the
African states, to that of support for indigenous rule.l97
Africa was rapidly assuming the role of full partner in
world politics .
Slowly, the United

~tates

had come to recognize

that Nationalism , not Communism was the ideology of the
mid-century years .

5enator J . W. Fulbright expressed the

percept in the following words:
Nationalism, I believe is the most pov1erful
single force in the worla politics of the
twentieth century, more powerful than conilllunism
or democracy or any other system of ideas
about social organization . l98
V.

NEU'l' RALIS~l,

OR NON - ALIGNlJJ.ENT

Having misunderstood the nature of African nationalism in relation to the struggle between the super powers ,
the United States also misconstrued the meaning of the
Africans when they spoke of being neutral .

l97Hans Kohn ana Wallace ~okolsky, African Nationalism
in the Twentieth Century {Princeton: lJ . Van Nostrana Company,
Incorporated, 1965), p . 13 .
l98J. \hlliam F'ulbright, Old l~lJ:ths and Ne\'1 Realities
{New York : Random House, 1964), p . 140.

86
Aside from the influence of a national traaition in which the principles of equality and
indepenaence had occupied a central place, it
was fully realized in '~iashington that the
emergence of new African states was altering
~he distribution of political power in the
world, especially in the Uni~ed Nations, in a
manner that made it increasingly imperative
to pay attention to African attitudes . l99
Africans were quick to recognize the leverage they
possessed because of the cold war, and they began to take
aavantage of that power.

The Conference of

~on -Aligned

Countries, held in Belgrade in l9bl, attracted ten African
states.

That conference was preceded by a preliminary

meeting in Cairo , wnich defined a non-aligned country in
the following way .

A non- aligned country would : pursue

independent policies of peac eful co - existence; would not
participate in multi- lateral military alliances such as
NATO , 0EATO, and CENTO; would support liberation and
independence movements; would not enter into bi-lateral
military alliances with the great powers.200
Africa had no reason to become involved in the cold
war .

It had enough problems without restricting its

alternatives in the international arena .

Kenyatta was

199Richard P . Stebbins (ed . ), Documents on American
Foreign Relations , 1960 (New York : Harper and Brothers,
1961)' p . 164 .
200
colin Legum, Pan-Africanism (New York : Frederick
A. Praeger, 1962), p. bO .
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once quoted as saying, in the words of an African proverb,
"VIhen two elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers . n201
If Africa became involved in the

East - ~.est

struggle directly,

then the newly independent governments would be the losers .
1iashington and lwioscow wanted them to become involved .
That was the policy of Dulles .

He insisted that each nation

must take part in the struggle, and not to do so was moral
turpitude.

He did not believe that one could indeed remain

neutral .
But , Africans insisted otherwise .

Julius Nyerere

asserted that the Africans woula indeed be able and intended
to be neither v~estern Democrats nor Communists . 202
Nyerere did not assert that Africans would be indifferent to the developments in the international arena, rather,
he indicated that neutrality was not the intention of Africa ,
but independence .
'l'om 1v1boya expressed the principle in the following
manner:

20lrlicnard P. Steboins (ed . ) , The United ~tates in
\Wrld Affairs, l9bl (New York : Harperana brothers, l9b2T,
p . 239; 1'he New York Times, April 12, l9bl, page 4 .
202Legum, ££· cit . , p . 114 .
2u3Kohn ana bokolsky, ££· cit ., p . 17 .
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Neutralism in the foreign policy of African
states simply means that they will not take
sides permanently and automati cally with
either the United States or the boviet Union .
• • • \'~e intend to decide on every international issue on its merits . 204
The new states are concerned about their integrity
as states, and are guarding jealously the right to determine their own directions .

Nyerere said :

'l'he first responsibility
its first principle--is the
'l'anzania ' s independence and
determine its own policies,
externa1 . 205

of the government -protection of
its freedom to
both internal and

This concern for the viability of tneir infant
countries has led East Africans often to take an anti American attitude .

~i.any

Americans have indicated dismay

when such attitudes were expressed in official communications and positions of the governments .

However, Ivlr . Nyerere

cogently explained this circumstance in an article in Africa
Report, when he said:
• • • until independence, the \'Jest never had
to consider Tanzania at all . It was automatically
"on their side . " Now they find that our support
is not assured--and this results in an illogical

204:zvlboya, Freedom and After, p . 23 5 .
205Julius K. Nyerere, "'l'he Costs of Non- Alignment,"
Africa Report, Vol . 11 , 7:b2, October , l9b6 .
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belief that we have become "unfriendly." They
have not yet accustomed themselves to the idea
that we are independent, ana that our friendship will now be genuine but our decisions will
be our own.206
The Tanzanian President used the analogy of a football game to describe his country's policy of neutrality.
It was tne intention of Tanzania to win the game for itself.
Tanzania has no other object in the international arena
than that of its own security and advancement. 2 07
If the

~ast

African states, especially Tanzania,

have seemed to be anti-\'lestern, the reason is that the West
has been more involved in that area than any other power .
Nyerere admits that Tanzanian utterances and policies have
been hostile to the \vest on occasion, but justifies tnis by
saying, " • • • both before and after independence, \lestern countries have interfered more actively--for both good
ana evil--in Africa than have the Eastern powers . n208
The neutrality of the African states has led them to
reject military alliances with all powers.

They have felt

that to allow the establishment, or continuance of bases on

206
Ibid . ' p . b3 •
208 Ibia., p . b3 .

20 7Ibia., p. bl .
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their soil would make them immediate targets in the event of
another general war. 2 09

Consequently, the Kenyans have

insisted that Britain liquidate its oases on their soil,
and the forces of the
African soil.

~~est

have been withdrawn from

~ast

Such a policy has not been viewed with

equanimity by the west, since the absence of military power
in East Africa makes sources of strategic minerals vulnerable in case of war with the Corrmunist states.
One result of such a neutral policy has been that
the \'lest has decreased its aid to that part of the world .
And , Julius Nyerere wrote a defense of his policy in Africa
Report saying, "If our determination to pursue this objective annoys some people who might otherwise have assisted
us in our economic development, what are we supposed to do?
Abandon our objective?n 210
Hecent developments in 1anzania have indicated that
that country fully intends to remain aloof from the power
struggle between the American and Russian governments.
Many have thought that
gerously close to orbit in the

~ast

Africa was drifting dan-

Corr~unist

galaxy .

But , a

number of blunders, by the Chinese in particular , have

209zviboya, !t'reedom and After, p . 23 b .
210Nyerere , ££• cit., p . 67.
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indicated that the leaders of those countries have not been
mesmerized by the Orientals .
In August, 1965, a Chinese correspondent was expelled
from Kenya because of his activities in the political
arena . 211
~tates

From that point , relations between the United

and Kenya began to grow more cordial .

~tebbins

Richard P .

summed up the situation in this way :

Nowhere was this apparent reaction against
Communist interference more noticeable than in
Kenya, whose venerable President, Jomo Kenyatta ,
was actively engaged in curbing the pro- Communist
maneuvers of Vice- President Oginga Odinga , • • •
"It is naive to think there is no danger of
imperialism from the East," Kenyatta declared .
"In World power politics the ~ast has as much
designs ( sic ] upon us as tne \'.est . n212
'l'he crux of the situation arrived in the person of
Chou en Lai , who visited Tanzania in 1965 .

vfuile making an

address in uar es Salaam, he made the mistake of saying that
an " • • • exceedingly favorable situation for revolution
prevails today in Africa . n213
Kenya immediately issued a statement that she would
avert all revolutions, for her own position was not yet

2llnFrom Cme, 1Jiany , n Newsweek, 6b : 45, August 9, 1965 .
21 2Hichard P . ~tebbins (ed . ) , The United ~tates in
\Jorld Affairs, 1965 (New York : Harper and How, 19bb) , p . 198 .
213Newsweek, 65 :44, June 21, 19b5 .

92
sec ure , and Nyerere took the t r ouble to say that his
government ' s position was one of non- alignment with the
Communist states as well as the \fest . 214

'l'he Chinese had

also failed to fully appreciate the strength of the East
African determination to remain i ndependent of the power
blocs of the world .
Russia, too , suffered in the eyes of the East
Africans , when a number of students returned from fJ1oscow
because of the treatment that had been accorued them there ,
and because of the death of a Ghanaian student under suspicious circumstances . 215
Tom Iv1boya has declared that , nthere are already several examples of occasions when Asian and African states
have successfully influenced the United Nations in the interests of world peace . n216
1ast Africans .

Clearly, that is the hope of the

They wish to exert their influence upon

the great powers and to enhance their own goals and power ,
in the hope that a third power can be made viable in the
present power struggle.

~lorld

214Richard P . ~tebbins (ed . ) , 1he United ~tates in
Affairs , 1..2.22. (New York : Harper ana .H.ow, l9bb),

p. 200 .

215rbid ., p . 199 .
21

~·'lboya, Freedom and After, p . 23b .
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VI •

COLONIALISI•1

Perhaps nothi ng has affected the United States'
relations with Last Africa more than the issue of colonialism .

Previous reference has been made to the United

&tates 1 commitment to an anti - colonial policy.

l•1ajor policy

statements over the past twenty years frequently have indicated such a stand .

'l'he question is whether the commit -

ment has always been real or merely for the record .
The discussion of colonialism was begun as early as

1944 when Julian Huxley wrote an article for the New
hepublic about the colonies and freedom for dependent
peoples .

In the article , Huxley scored the United States

because the discussion of colonialism always was in regard
to British colonialism .

He spoke of a period measured in

decades before inaependence could be considered for the
dependent territories of Britain . 21 7
An answer to the Huxley article was made by I•.. elville

J. Herskovits , in which he spoke of the American experience
in the Philippines as an indication of what might be expected of depenaent peoples .

He advocated

11
•

•

0

freedom for

217 Julian Huxley , "Coloni es ana lt~ reeaom, 11 New
liepublic , 110 :106 , Janua ry 24 , 1944 .
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all men and women to live their lives in their own ways ,
and in terms of those ways of life, to govern themselves . n2 l$
Herskovits also wrote an article in 1944, for
Foreign Affairs , in which he cited Uganda as an example of
the ability of africans to govern themselves .

Uganda was a

standard example of the Africans ' capacity to organize themselves politically .

Herskovits called for sincere , effec-

tive preparation of the native peoples for independence . 219
Walter

~ulzbach ,

writing in the American

~cholar,

cited the necessity of restricting the sovereignty of the
national states of the world if conflicts were to be
settled peaceably, and he said , "The solution of the colonial problem lies in the same direction .

There is no other

choice if national liberty is to exist without the comple ment of international anarchy . u 22 0
The issue was joined before the war had ended .

The

United 0tates called for an end to colonialism in the postwar era .

Her allies insisted that there was neither moral

nor political grounds for doing so .

0n the contrary , as has

21$Ibid ., p . 101 .
219I•1elville J . Herskovits, "Native .::>elf- Government, n
Foreign Affairs, 22 :417- 1$, April, 1944 .
22~~alter ~ulsbach , "l<'uture of Colonies , " American

.::>cholar, Vol . 13 , 1:57, January , 1944 .
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already been citea, Britain and the United States were
dependent upon the strategic metals and the strategic
defense value of

~ast

and Central Africa for the support of

their massive production of goods .
Because of preoccupation in Europe with Russia ' s
threat to expand farther toward the \'lest ern Allies, '1 ruman
ana his colleagues were not in a position to pursue the
matter of inaepenaence for Britain ' s colonies , especially
those of Africa .
In 1952, the North African scene began to burn with
the fires of rebellion .

Egypt forcea the abdication of its

king, ana revolutionaries took over the country . And Russia
began to attack the \'l est on the colonial issue . 221
Colin Legum has written:
'l'wo important events intervenea between the last
Pan- African Congress (1945) and the first Conference of Independent African ~tates (1958) • 'l'he
first was Egypt ' s February 23rd Revolution (1952)
which marks the breakthrough of modern Arab
nationalism; the second was the Bandung Conference
{1955) which was symptomatic of Asia ' s arrival on
the world scene . 222

22 l'l'he New York Times, February 3, 1952, page 3 .
222

Legum, ££ · cit ., p . 39 .
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These two events heralded the entr ance of former
colonial states into the world arena .

After this time

the newer states could be ignored no longer.

The West

was forced to accept and evaluate their judgment of world
affairs .

The weapon of the newly independent countries was

the United Nations .

The new states were admitted to member-

ship in the organization and proceeded to make it do their
bidding, as evaluated by the Council on Foreign Relations:
The primary function of the United Nations,
in the eyes of its founders, had been the adjustment of disputes among individual states, not
the accomodation of a quasi - revolutionary movement which in fact was sweeping over half a
world and respected neither political boundaries
nor legal and administrative forms . 223
The Charter of the United

~ations

was filled with

iaealistic statements which promised equal rights and selfaetermination, and was interpreted by the newer nations to
mean that foreign rule over aependent peoples would have to
be brought to an end . 224
Subjugated people of the world were uniting and they
were aetermined that colonialism would end .

That determina-

tion was not lost on the Unitea States, for the African

223Hichard P . Stebbins (ed . ), The United ~tates in
World Affairs , ~ (New York: harper ana brotners, 1953),
p . 352 .
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Bureau was created in 1957, in response to the evident need
to establish contact with the African states themselves ,
rather than conauct future business through the European
sections of the btate Department .
President

~isenhower

indicated 1960 as the year of

real re- evaluation, saying :
In early 1960 , when the in<iependence move ment really began to snowball , it became
obvious that our traaitional policy of refraining from involvement in areas consiaerea to be
under the hegemony of other nations had to be
re- examined . 225
'l hy tne re - examination aia not take place sooner was
not explained by Eisennower , for in his secona inaugural
speech in 1957, the President saia , concerning the colonies ,
"There harshly blow the winds of change . n 226 However, the
Unitea btates was reluctant to abandon the status guo , in
aealing with the dependent states , until 1960 .
Henry Cabot Lodge manifested the changed attitude
of the

Uni~ed ~tates

in his participation in the

~ecurity

Council debate, even at the risk of arousing the ire of
friendly nations , such as the Union of ~outn Africa . 22 7

225.r.:isenhovfer, v/aging Peace : 1.2..2..2.- 61, p . 572 .
226Ibid ., p . 103 .
227Richard P . Stebbins (ea . ) , The United ~tate s in
World Affairs, 1960 (New York : harper ana brothers, l9bl),
p . 164; United Nations Review, ~a) 30, l9b0, pp . 851 - 52 .
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In gearing its policy to broad support of
African nationalist aspirations, the United
~tates faced hazards potentially more serious
than the alienation of some tens of thousands
of white East Africans . 228
Included in the risks assumed in supporting the anticolonialism of the Africans was the possibility that they
would align themselves with the Communist bloc , or that they
would deny the

·~Jest

ac cess to their rich stores of raw

materials .
However, before it is concluded that the policy of
the United

~tates

had taken a complete turn about , it should

be notea that in regard to the resolution presented to the
General Assembly of the United Nations in December , l 9b0 ,
the United

~tates

abstained from voting .

The following

excerpt from Schlesinger 1 s book, A 'l'housand Days, is
enlightening :
Our delegation even had the concurrence of
the ~tate De partment in \'Jashington in its desire
to vote for the resolution . But the British were
opposed , and Harold l~1acmillan called .t:isenhower
by transatlantic telephone to request American
abstention . When an instruction to abstain
arrived from the White House, James J . \'ladsworth,
then our ambassador to the ill~, tried to reach
~isenhower to argue the case .
~isenhower
aeclinea to accept his call . \\adsworth loyally
defended the American abstention in the General
Assembly . 229
228Richard P. 5tebbins (ed . ) , The United States in
\'iorla Affairs , l9ol (New York: Harper and Hrot hers, l9o2j,
p . 248 .
22

9~chlesinger , ££• cit ., p . 510 .
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Such a performance, after the President had appeared before
the Assembly to present a plan for the aid of the African
states, hardly testified to a change of policy with regard
to colonialism.230
Of much significance also was the fact that in the
debate Khruschev demanded the immediate liquidation of colonial holdings, and the Soviet Union was listed as voting
in the affirmative on the resolution, while the United States
and eight other non-Communist states abstained . 2 3l
Additionally, the United States abstained on an
African resolution which called for the recognition of
Africa as a "denuclearized zone .n232
John F. Kennedy brought a new interest to the government concerning Africa .

He took the first opportunity to

reverse the impression made in December, 1960, by the
Eisenhower Administration .

The resolution on Angola gave

him a chance, ana shortly afterward he expressed verbally
his sympathy for the people of Africa in their struggle. 2 33

230Bretton, ££· cit., p . 460.
2 31Richard P . Stebbins (ed . J , The United btates in
World Affairs, l9b0 (New York: Harper and brothers, 1961),
p. 35b; United Nations Review , January, l9bl, pp. b-9.
232Richard P . Steboins (ed . ), The United btates in
World Affairs, l9bl (New York : Harper and Brothers, 19o2T,
p . lOb .

233~chlesinger, ££• cit., p . 55b .
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Schlesinger gave this opinion of Kennedy's view of
colonialism:

" • • • Kennedy saw it as inherently non-

genteel and probably inseparable from disorder, excess and
a certain bitterness toward the v.est . n 2 34 In his view, to
strengthen the African states would be to preserve the
favorable attitudes of the governments of the new states,
whether or not they accepted the system of the United
States . 235

Khruschev taunted Kennedy about American policy

in regard to colonialism .

He suggested that Kennedy ' s

policy was unev en and timid and that:
• • • it might endorse anti - colonialism for
tactical reasons, but its heart was with the
colonialists . Why not adopt the Soviet policy
of tolerance and non-interference?236
American influence had a part in the demise of
colonialism .

In many ways , official ana private, inten-

tional and unintentional, iaealistic and selfish, the
United States has presented the picture of a state which
is opposed to the foreign rule of any people .
However, no matter what the American contribution may have been, American foreign
policy conduct over the years appears to have
been more responsive to the facts of United

234Ibid . , p . 508 .
236rbid . , p . 364 .
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~tates domestic and of international politics
than to humanitarian, idealistic goals . 237

Probably, there is nothing more deflating to an
American than to discover that his government has been and
is now following a policy that is dictated by sheer politics
rather than by high idealism .
VII .

AFRICAN 80CIALISiv1

Socialism, regardless of its qualifying word, is not
a well respected concept in the United &tates .

Because of

this, there has been an attitude of suspicion when the
Africans speak of their own peculiar brand of Socialism .
The contrast between traditional African society and
the modern industrial society of the Y.est is striking .
fuboya has observed, the acquisitive instinct in the

As

~est

has been responsible for many of the excesses to be found
there , and this acquisitive instinct is largely lacking
within the traditional African society . 238
Barbara uiJard, writing in 'l'he New York 'l'imes in 1952,
stated that

u

•••

hitherto, the transfer of wealth to

2 37Bretton, ££· cit . , p . 444 .
2 3Br.rlboya, Freedom and After, p. 163 .
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other areas has been thought of almost exclusively in
terms of profit.n239
Julius Nyerere has pointed out the genius of the
African society:
Traditionally we lived as families, with
individuals supporting each other and helping
each other on terms of equality . \'~e recognized that each of us had a place in the community, and this place carried with it rights
to whatever food ana shelter was available in
return for the use of whatever abilities and
energies we had . The old, and the sick, or
those whose crops had been destroyed by natural
disasters, were not left alone in their
suffering . 240
Nyerere recognized the difficulty involved in transferring the traditional values to the modern social organization, yet, he apparently intends to try to retain the purpose of the traditional society saying:
• • • The purpose remains the same as in
the traditional society. That is, the welfare of every individual in the context of
the needs of the society of which he is a
member . 24l
The fear of the Capitalist society that 5ocialism produces laziness is countered by the citation of an old

239Barbara Ward, "The Jv~.oral Issue Thrust Upon Us,"
The New York Times , December 28, 1952, page 6 .
240Nyerere, QQ• cit., p. 67 .
241 1b . .
~-
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African proverb which says, 1fJvlgeni siku mbili; siku Y2 tatu
mpe jembe,n (Treat your guest as a guest for two days; on
the third day give him a hoe) . 242
The land is a crucial point in the African concept,
for it is the one source of wealth for the great majority
of the population .

Contrasted with the vlestern view of

land as personal property, the African traditional society
is undeniably egalitar ian . 2 43 Any member of the society has
available to him the means of subsistence .

He cannot be

denied that right so long as he is a responsible participant in the group life . 244

~boya has said that:

The practice of African bocialism involves
trying to use what is relevant and good in
these African customs to create new values in
the changing world of the money economy, to
build an economy which reflects the thinking
of the great majority of the people . Few
Africans are so Westernized and de- tribalized
that these attitudes no longer have their
hola on them . 245
In the effort to establish viable states in areas
that are united by tenuous national feelings, the African
statesmen are seeking to utilize the traditional social
organization, which is socialistic, to promote the feeling

2 4 2Mboya, Freedom and After, p . lb3 .
2 43rbid . , p . 164 .
245rbid . , p . lb7 .

244rbid . , p . lb3 .
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of commonality .

'I'his is called "familyhoodn by Nyerere

and may be found in varying definitions in the statements
of other apologists of the African cause . 246
That the concept of African Socialism is greatly
different from Western Capitalism is not questioned .
Nyerere has made the contrast in very strong terms . 247
But , it is pointed out by

'I' om

:Mboya that African 3ocialism

is also unlike guropean Socialism . 2 48

These men are saying

that they are trying to organize African life in a peculiarly African way, not patterned on life in other areas of
the world .
Julius Nyerere has expressed the aim of the African
leaders:
We need to live harmoniously among ourselves;
we need to safeguard our society; we need to respect ourselves and deserve the respect of others .
These things are equally important . "~lan does not
live by bread alone . n24~

Z4 6Ibid . , p . 168 .

24 7Ibid ., p . lb9 .

248rbid . , p . 167 .
249N yerere, ££·

"t . ,
£!_

p . 67 •
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VIII .

THE ONE- PARTY

~'l'ATE

Most of the new African states have adopted a oneparty political system .

\'lith a few notable exceptions,

they have seen fit to either continue the single party
which brought them to independence, or to unite all parties
into one national party after independence has been
achieved . 2 5°
Western leaders have been critical of the singleparty system because it seems inconsistent with the concept
of democracy which they cherish .

They have argued that it

gives rise to dictatorships which will not allow the formation of opposition parties, or, at best, will not allow
them to function as true oppositions . 251
President Nyerere has entered a plea for understanding of the difficulties involved in consolidating the
fruits of independence, and asking for time to develop the
institutions of political life necessary for the functioning of a modern state . 252

5~ . Gray Cowan, The Dilemmas of African Independence
York : Walker and Company, l9b4J, p . 7 .
2

(~ew

2 51 Ibia . , p . 8 .
252Julius K. Nyerere, 11 Africa l\leeds Time," The New
York 'l'imes lvlagazine, l~1arch 27, 1960, p . 19 .
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"African arguments supporting the single- party system
are based on both pragmatic and theoretical grounds . n 2 53
African leaders claim that a strong po·wer is needed in the
initial stages of independence , and that there is no necessity
for multi- party arrangements in order to maintain democracy .
Also , Sulzberger obse r ved, "Democracy, as defined in terms
of the present broad world cleavages, has provided no
answers other than shibboleths . n254
lvlboya presented the follO\'ling argument to support
the claim of Africans that they do maintain democracy :
A government which gives all citizens the
right to vote , the right to contest elections
ana the right to express themselves freely
inside and outside of parliament is not
undemocratic . 255
Mboya also says that the opposition parties must
develop naturally , out of the issues which present themselves to the country , not because the political science
textoooks say so . 2 5 6 'l'he Africans are well aware of the

253cowan, loc . cit .
254c . 1 . ~ulzberger, dispatch from Capeto\'m, 3outh
Africa for 'l'he New York Times, January lS , 1953, page 3 .
255'l'on1 J . !•J.boya, "Party System ana Democracy in
Africa," F.oreign Affairs, 4l:b58, June, l9b3 .
2 56r.egum,

.QE. ·

cit . , p . l23 .
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length of time it has required to develop the political
institutions of the West , and that those institutions are
still developing .

Therefore, they do not accept the \Jest -

ern definition of democracy , which seems to require simply
more than one party . 2 57
Nyerere has said that an opposition party is a matter
of indifference , because it will not affect the free discussion of the issues , or the equality found in that freedom
of discussion . 2 58
Accordi ng to Nyerere, the substance of democracy is
freedom of discussion and equality among those who participate . 259

If these are maintained , then democracy is a fact,

even though a political opposition may not be organized .
'l'he Western structure is considered alien to African soci ety and incompatible with its goals and psychology . 200
The question for the United States is whether it can
accept a definition of democracy which runs counter to
popular concepts, in the special case of Africa .

The matter

seems to cause no difficulty in regard to other countries
such as Portugal , Spain, and the South American countries .

2 57cowan,

2.£ · cit . , p . 9 .

258Legum, 2.£ · cit . , p . 123 .
2 6°cowan ,
______./

2.£ · cit . , p . 11 .

2 59rbia ., p. 122.
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Further, will reaction to the African concepts of democracy
adversely affect American aid to those new countries?
IX .

CONCLUSION

The foregoing are some of the issues which have
affected the relationships between the East African
countries , especially Tanzania, and the United States .
The United States has been sensitive to these
matters th r oughout the per iod discussed here .

And , the

sensitivity of the government to the possibility of African
support or rejection has caused relations to become
strained at times .

A careful inquiry into the significance

of African ideas and customs might aid in the establishment
of more harmonious relationships with East African governments .

)

CHAPTER V
THE

ECCJ1~0Iv1IC

The waning days of \'lorld

FAC'l'vRS
~~ar

II saw the United

faced with a formiaable economic problem .

~tates

How could the

government prevent the collapse of the economy when the
heavy demand upon its proauctive facilities by war no longer
existed?2bl

The country was faced with the necessity of

converting the economy from wartime production to a
peacetime basis .
A solution to the problem began while the war still
was in progress .

The administration viewed the problem as

one of prime importance . 2o2

The obvious answer lay in

securing foreign markets for the produce of the economy .
'!'his meant that a liberalization of world trade would have
to be effected and the f r ee flow of goods allowed . 2 b3
Alvin W. Hansen suggested three means to achieve a
balance in international trade and production :

Z61J . Fred Rippy, "Historical Perspective," Foreign
Aid Re - examined, James ~4 . v.iggins and Helmut 0choeck,
eaitors hJashington : Public Affairs Press, 195$), p . $ .
Z62 Ibid .
263Ibia .
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The main means to achieve international equilibrium are (a) the promotion of full employment
in the industrially mature countries, and especially in the United btates, (b) the development
and industrialization of the backward countries
designea to change the structure of their economies , and (c) a liberalization of commercial and
tariff policies throughout the world , and notably in the United ~tates . 2b4
Hansen also suggested that the end of the war signalled a change in the economic relationships of the nations of
the w6rld .
raw

He asserted that the old routine of exchanging

ma~erials

for the finished product would end ana a new,

complex trade between highly diversified economies would
emerge . 265
An international conference was called in

1~44

for

the purpose of dealing with the post - war economic problen1 .
The

Bretton-~oods

the United

Conference dealt with the necessity of

and other countries, to maintain the
export sectors of their economies . 26 b
~tates,

Bankers objected to the establishment of the International l>!onetary J.i'und, v1hich would maintain an equilibrium
among the industrial nations of the world .

They charged

2b4Alvin H. Hansen, Amer1ca'~ Rol~_ in the World
l!:conomy (New York: .. . ,•• Norton and Company, 1945j, p . 30.

2b6liippy, ££· cit ., p . 10 .
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that such an organization would introauce lending methods
which were not in keeping with accepted credit principles . 2b7
While the bankers aid not object to the United States playing a role in the international economy, they did have something to say about the methods used in performing that role .
'l'he primary concer n of the planners in the last stages
of the war was the ability of the United
to maintain their
the world . 2 b8

posi~ions

~tates

and Britain

in the production and trade of

Adolf A. Berle , jr . has suggested that the United
~tates

had three alternatives in the post - war economic world .

One was to persuade the government to conquer as much terri tory as was necessary for tne purpose .

Another was to enter

into direct competition for sources of raw materials and
markets .

'l'he third , and feasible one , was to enter into

cartels with the Buropeans in the allocation of raw materi als and markets . 269
The last of these suggestions is the one adopted by
international businessmen, because it was necessary .

267nbretton- Woods C.onference," Time, 45:86,
February 12 , 1945 .
---268~ • .B . Harris, "broader Issues of Bretton-Woods,"
New Republic, 111:125- 28, July 31 , 1944 .

269Adolf A. berle, Jr . , 'l'he 'l'wentieth Centu_ry
Capitalist Revolution (New York : Harcourt , brace ana
C.ompany, 1954), pp . 120- 21 .
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But, the government frowned upon such activity, ana pro hibited the format-ion of such organizations in the domestic
sector, which sug6ests an ambivalence on the part of the
government .

Domestically it diu not allow the practices

which it condoned, of necessity, abroad .
becretary of State Baward R. btettinius said, in his
report to President 1 ruman after the San I<'rancisco conference, that economic prosperity for the United States involved
restoration of other economies of the world . 270
1'he policy of the United States then began to point
to the assistance of other governments .
the economies of other states, the United
strengthening her own economy .

By strengthening
~tates

would be

President Truman justified

h~program of aid with the assertion that a two per cent
rise in living standards in Asia anci Africa would keep
Western industry booming for a century . 2 7l
Three external forces raised the sensitivity of the
United

~tates

to events in the world economy .

They were

the boviet - bloc rivalry, the intervention of the less

270R·~ppy, 2E·

't . ,
£1_

p . 10 •

2 71Truman, l94b- 2..?_, Years of 'l'rial and Hope, p . 275 .
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developed nations in international relations , and the
strong competition of vie stern i!;urope and Japan . 272
The phenomenon callea

"~oviet

throughout the post - war era . 273

effect" was noticeable

The results of the reaction

to boviet action were seen in every area of economics :
In the sphere of United ~tates foreign policy
in particular , ~oviet -bloc rivalry dominated ~he
magnituae ana airection of the government ' s
foreign aid program , totaling almost ~73 billion
oetween mid - 1945 and the end of 1959 . 274
~o,

the policy of the Unitea

least two principles .

~tates

was based on at

One was the need to strengthen the

export sector of the economy by aiding other economies .
The other was the reaction to the

~oviet

initiative .

\fuatever the motives may have been, the policy of
the ........ __
government
in the post- war world was to allow American
_
capital to flow out to the rest of the world, particularly
~urope,

in order that those countries might become importers

of United btates gooas .

In this way the United States became
an exporting nation rather than an importing nation . 2 75

272Harold G. Vatter, 1he U. ~ . ~conomy in th~ 1950 ' s
(Nevv York: \L \'i. Norton and Company, 19o3), p . 17 .
2 73Ibid . , p . 2)$ .
2 75Ibid ., p. 20 .
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Interest in Africa developed along with the normal
interest in overseas investment .

The United States had

always had a sizeable interest in

~outh

Africa, and the

export of capital caused outflows of money to that country
as well as other areas that were of strategic importance or
were promising fields for investment. 2 76

Also, it was recog-

nized that the very size of American businesses made them
determinative in the economies of other nations. 2 77
vfuen
not change .

~isenhower

became President the ideology did

He conunents:

"\'lhen shallow critics denounce the profit
motive inherent in our system of private
enterprise, they ignore the fact that it is
the economic support of every human right
w~ssess and that without it all rights
~uld soon disappear . u278
Harold G. Vatter makes this statement:
Review of American foreign policy in the 1950's
has revealed a persistent conflict between historic
mercantilistic drives and a new sensitivity to the
economic needs of other nations. lv!orality and
utopian notions of selflessness aside, it is

276"Africa ~outh of the ~ahara ," Nation, 177:557,
December 26, 1953 .
277Berle, 2£• cit . , p . 119 .
278Dwight D. iisenhower, quoted in The New York
Times, January 13, 1952, page 5 .
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difficult not to see the mercantilistic considerations in every ruajor aspect of policy . 279
Materialism is inherent in capitalism.

There is no

way by which the system may be anything else, in its present
form.

The surprising thing is that so few Americans seem

to recognize that they are materialistic.

The materialistic

outlook is readily evident to foreigners who come to this
country, however .

One stuaent from Kenya has comrr1ented that

American fear of Communism was based on the assumption that
it would take away their wealth and possessions .

He further

stated:
\ihenever I have b een given a ride to the
college by my fellow students I am asked, "Do
yotyi.ike cars?" or "Do you have many cars in
Kenya?" or nWhat type of houses do you live
in?" or "Do you like TV?" To me there is
nothing wrong with asking these questions
except that they reveal the kind of things
you live for. Nobody has yet asked me how
we are trying to develop Kenya or what
Kenya's real needs are as she approaches the
day of her inaependence.2SO
The United States proceeded to build up a prodigious
economic capacity.

And, coupled with the productive

2 79vatter, ££• cit., p . 279.
2 g0Amos Kiriro, "An African Student .:,tudies Us,"
The New York 1imes Jl.iagazine, lJecember 10, 1961, p. 16.
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capacity of other nations of the world, mankind had the
resources and the power to wipe poverty from its miast . 2 Bl
Near the ena of his tenure as President,

~isenhower

began to stress the need of Africa south of the Sahara,
and to make provision for the development of that area in
the foreign aia enactments of Congress .
1960, a special allocation of

~20

He proposed, in

million to initiate a

program of education and training in the southern part of
Africa . 2 g 2
The Unitea btates realized its mistake in unaerestimating the virulence of the national movements in Africa.
Now it began a concerted effort towara regaining the confidencer the new states .

As Nyerere said, the lJnited States

had missed its opportunity in regard to the freedom movements, but it could still claim opportunities in the
economic field.283
'l'hat the economic policy of the United States was
airected toward the enhancement of
clear.

i~s

own position seems

DeVere E. Pentony has remarkea:

2Slvatter, QE . cit . , p . l .
28 2H.ichard P . ~teboins ( ed . 1, '!'he Unitea btates 1.n
\tlorla .ri.ffairs, 1960 (New York: Harperand brotners, l9oiT,
p. 169 .
ZS3Ibid .
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The economic interests of the United ~tates
in the growth of the less developed members of
the Free \'lorld community are real, but proba bly
not critical, in relation to the total size of
our economy . Nevertheless, development of a
part of the world containing over a billion
people who now produce and consume too little
could hardly fail to add to the size of our
foreign trade, perhaps to increase it considerably.
It should also enrich American lives by increasing the variety of gooas in our markets,and by
increasing opportunities for work and travel
abroad . 284
0chlesinger has saia that by 1960 the foreign aid
policy of the United

~tates

concepts and programs . 285

had stagnated, both in its
The Kennedy Administration set

out to remedy the situation, as it conceived the problem .
Kennedy is quoted by &chlesinger:
"The funaamental task of our foreign aia
program in the 1960's is not negatively to
fight communism: its fundamental task is to
h~ake a historical demonstration that in
the twentieth century, as in the nineteenth-in the southern half of the globe as in the
north --economic growth and political democracy
can develop hand in hand. 11 286
Kennedy asserted that the goal of American aid to
the African states should not be to make them pawns in

2 B4ueVere B. ~entony (ed . ) , The Underdeveloped Lands:
A Dilemma of the International Bcon'OniY (~an .B'rancisco:
Chandler Publishing Company, l9b0), p . 22.
285 Arthur lv1 . ~chlesinger, Jr ., A 'l'housana Days
(Boston: Houghton 1~1ifflin Company, 1965), p . 586 .
286John F . l\.enneay, quotea by Arthur lv1 . :Jchlesinger,
Jr ., in A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Iv1ifflin Company,
l9b5), p. 592 .
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the cold war .

He felt that the cola war angle had been

overemphasized as the only apoarent way to persuade Congress to vote necessary funas . 28 7 ~ignificant, however,
· is ti"1e fact that funas for foreign aid declined during
Kennedy ' s Administration . 28 8
The enlightening report of the Clay

Cor.~ittee ,

which investigated the activities of the Agency for International Dev elopment , reveals the extent to which the
(

United
motive .

~tates

government was

~chlesinger

1

corrmi~ted to

the profit

remarks :

• . • Buried in tne r eport was a systematic
hostility to forms of dev elopment which did not
yiela private profit . 1~1ost of the changes it
proposea were intended to promote American
private investment . borne abroad read t he document as a sta~ement of the thesis that the point
of foreign aid was to facilitate the penetration
of the developing world by American business . 289
Perhaps most reveal ing of all is the statement made
by G. l'•1ennen \'iilliams in 1964 :
When our AID program provides a bull aoze r,
or a shipload of wheat from our farm surplus , the
story does not end at that point . The first shipment may be paid for by a grant or a l oan

Z87'l'he New York 'l'imes , July 6 , 1959 , page 26 .

288~chlesinger , 2£ • cit ., p . 599 .
289rbid . , p . 598 .
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provided by the U. ~ . taxpayer. But bulldozers need spare parts and must be replaced
one day, and telecommunication networks are
often extended. Even dietary habits may
change through increased use of American
food products . New tastes and needs for
American products can lead to new commercial
sales, and this development can be an important end result of our AID program around the
world.290
Then , the economic policy of the United

~tates

since

1945 has had as its goals the rebuilding of European
economies, the establishment of a sound economy in newly
independent states, the isolation and weakening of the
boviet Union, ana the enhancement of its own economy.291
'l'his study is now concerned with the directions this
policy took in the years since 1945, particularly in relation to East Africa.

I.

THE DIIiliCTIONS OF UNIT.r;D STATES' bCONOMIC POLICY
The

N~rshall

Plan, which provided for rebuilding the

war-ravaged areas of Europe, met with great success.

As the

effectiveness of the plan continued, the administration began

2 90a. 1~1ennen vlilliams, "New Patterns of African 'lrade,"
Department of State Bulletin , 50:b68, April 27, 1964.
291Rippy, ££• cit., p . 1.
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to look for new areas of penetration .

Greece was aided in

1947 in her fight against the Communist effort to take over
the country, and Turkey also received aid . 2 92
Additionally, the International l•ionetary Fund was in
operation by 1947, dealing only with non - Co~nunist member
governments and their banks . 2 93 This fund allowed governments faced with financial difficulty to draw upon the
resources of the other member countries when feasible .
In 1949 'l'ruman proposed a plan for aiding countries
in economic distress .

'l'he fourth point of his plan commit-

ted him to a program of direct aid to the underdeveloped
countries of the world . 294

'l'he plan called for exportation
of surplus capital that had been accumulating . 2 95 Under

the program, implemented June 5 , 1950, and called simply
"Point Four,n 2 96 the United ::>tates carried the cold war
to the &oviets with confidence that the American system
would prevail and that stable political systems would

292'1'ruman,

l2b:..Q_-.2£,

Years of Trial and. Hope, p . 265 .

293vatter, £E· cit . , p . 276.
294Truman , ~-2£, Years of Trial ~Hope, p . 269 .
295Ibid ., p . 268 .
2 9 6 Ibid . , p . 271 .

.. -uu.o,..cf'\THAM

uaRAR''
.
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be established in the newly independent states.

Those gov-

ernments were expected to be friendly to the United
States. 2 97
Point Four fulfilled the expectations of the Truman
Administration.

He remarked in Janua ry, 1952:

This is Point Four-- our Point Four program at
work . It is working--not only in Inaia--but in
Iran, in Paraguay and Liberia-- in thirty-three
countries arouna the globe . Our technical
missionaries are out there . we need more of
them . ~·,e need more funds to speed their
efforts, because there is nothing of greater
importance in our foreign policy . There is
nothing that shows more clearly what we
stand for and what we want to achieve . 298
In the same month this statement was made, \/alter
Van Kirk told a group of missionary executives that Point
Four was being diverted from its humanitarian aims and was
being used for military purposes and for cold war
strategy . 2 99
In

~larch,

Congress for

1952, Truman submitted a request to the

~5,350,000,000

~4,070,000,000

for foreign aid .

Of that amount

was to go to Western Europe for weapons .

'l'he Middle East and Africa were allotted

~b5b,OOO,OOO

in

297Ibid ., p . 276 .
298The New York 'l'imes, January 10, 1952, page 16 .
299The New York Tim~, January b, 1952, page 15.
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technical aia and other as&istance .

In making his request,

1ruman cited the danger of Comntunist penetration, but he
also said that the United

~tates

was dependent on foreign

sources of raw materials . 300
~evera1

versions of international cooperation organi-

zations were brought forward in the succeeding years .

'lhe

.t:conomic Cooperation administration, 1948- 51, The l•1utual
~ecurity

Administration, 1951, The Foreign Operations

Administration in 1953 and The International Cooperation
Administration in 1955 all carried forward the initial
goals of the foreign aid programs . 301
'lhe 1-mtual becurity Administration attempted to
emphasize investment in the less aeveloped areas of the
world, but enaed with the preponderance of its funds
invested in Western ~urope . 3° 2
The l•mtual becurity Administration included
military goals within its guidelines .
of

the ~ .

Ostensibly , the aim

S. A. was to strengthen the economies of the

recipients.

Basil Davidson pointed out in 1952 t hat:

3°0The New York Times , ~~rch 7, 1952, page 1.
3°1 s c hl es1nger
·
, 2E •

·t
£!_.,

p . 586 •

3°2vatter, QE. cit ., p . 269 .
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• • • though large sums are being spent
through the 11/mtual Security Administration and
other agencies to oromote certain kinds of
industry in colonial territories , such spending is being presented to the world as a contribution to the development of backward areas;
in reality it is merely imperialism in a new
form . 303
Harold G. Vatter makes the point that after the
foreign aid organization had been converted from the Economic
~ooperation

Agency to the Mutual Security Agency, foreign

aid became more concerned with military aid than before .

Throug~952

military aia amounted to some

~6

bilJion, while

1953 - bO saw the amount rise to some :p24 billion .

The total

aid amounts remained rather stable . 304
Assistance was notably small for underdeveloped areas
of the world; most of the aid given by tne United States
still went to Burope . 305
American interest in Africa centered around the fact
that vital raw materials were obtained from Central Africa
and strategic metals from mines in East Africa . 3°6

303Basil Davidson , "Cashing in on Old Imperialisms,"
Nation , 175 : 209- 10 , September 13, 1952 .
304vatter , ££· cit ., p . 271

306~ . B. Fay, "United ~tates Interest in Africa , 11
Current History , 25:47- 51, July , 1953 .
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Because Africa was a politically sensitive area, and
demanding recognition , the United States felt it could
extend certain forms of aid ana encouragement .

In so doing,

the vulnerable new countries might be saved from Communism,
and the vital materials ana territory saved for the West . 307
In a message to Congress in 1956 President

~isenhower

indicated that it was especially important to encourage
forces friendly to the United btates , and for that reason he
asked Congress to extend aid for certain programs in
Africa . 3°8
Toward the end of the 1950's the geographical distribution of non- military aid shifted from the European
area to less developed areas .

It then began to center

on the areas which were strategic

mili~arily ,

but were

woefully underdeveloped , and whose costs of development
were rising precipitously .3°9
The value of economic assistance was recognized
by those who were coming to power in

~ast

Africa .

Mboya,

writing in Atlantic in 1959, sanctioned American aid and

3°7cyril Bryner, "Russia and Kenya," Current
History, 25 :43, July, 1953, p . 43 .
308Dwight D. ~isenhower, Public Papers of the
Presidents, 1.22..2. (\'•ashington : Government Printing Office ,
1958) , p . 319 .
309vatter, 2E · cit . , p . 271 .
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admitted that the capital and technical skills for development of the African economies had to come from abroad . 310
\'ihile some American aid ·was being sent to the newly
independent states, most of the money was going to those
countries which had been self-governing for a long time,
or which had peculiar interest for the United St ates . 3ll
Reflecting the reluctance of the Unitea States to
enter the new nations with massive aid, the Eisenhower
Administration called upon

~uropeans

to continue support-

ing the countries of Africa that haa once been their colonial
territories.31 2 However, as 19b0 ushered in a great number
of new states, the United States offered to assist them .
President Kennedy promised that Tanganyika woula receive
million as a loan, as well as assistance in a threeyear development plan . 31 3 The actual figure amounted to
~10

:p6 . 2 million.Jl4

310Tom J . l•1boya, "African Revolution," Atlantic,
203:44, April, 1959 .
311 Henry L . Hretton, "United btates Foreign ~olicy
'l'oward the Newly Independent ~tates," African lnaependence
Peter Juda, editor (New York : Dell Publishing Company,
l9b2), p . 456 .
312Vatter, ££ · c~t
. ., p . 18. .
313Hichard P. ~teboins (ed . ), The United States in
~Jorla Affairs, 19bl {New York : Harper and Brothers , l9b2},
p . 275 .

314I•1boya, Freedom and After, p. 241.
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The Kennedy years saw an increased interest in
Africa, but, the continent continued to receive scant
attention as comparea with the rest of the world . 315
And, the United

~tates

was warned that it must not expect

the recipients of aia to accept it with no qualifications
in the terms of agreement .316
lJlboya, too, sounded a warning note to the United
States in regard to what it might expect to gain from the
money it expendea in

~ast

Africa:

I believe that in the past the Americans gave
aid in expectation of friendship and even of
political support . But increasingly they are
becoming aware that such a process brings them
in return resentment, rather than frienaship .
'l'he change in American attitudes over aid has
come because the numoer of independent states
has grown and the voice of the colonial powers,
find1ng an echo in the United Sta~es, has become
weaker . Like everyone else, the Americans have
now haa to come to grips with the real Africa,
meeting and negotiating with African leaders,
rather than doing business through the British
and french . 317
The expectation of many is that the future is where
American economic interest lies .

As Africa develops it

3l5Richard P . 0tebbins (ed . ), The United ~tates in
\'lorld .Affairs, 1.2£2.. (New York: harper and How, 196b J,
p . 192 .
3lbrtelen Kitchen, "Africa and the Kennedy Era," Nevr
Republic, 143:17- 19, December 12, 19bu .
3171v1boya, Freeaom and After, p . 241.
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will require American goods in ever increasing volume, and
the demand for African raw materials will correspondingly
increase . 3l$
Clearly, then, american economic policy was centered
in aiding the economies of the underdeveloped countries of
the world, in the hope that such aid would block their drift
toward a communistic society and that it would create new
demands for Western gooas and services, which would enhance
the Western economy .
II .

AID TO EAST AFH.ICA

1'he strategic importance of East Africa in the event
of another world conflict has already been alluded to in
Chapters I and III , and that
the

corr~unications

impor~ance

facilities of

~ast

is readily seen when

and Central Africa are

traced on a map .
~he

region contains the major portions of the stra-

tegic and precious metals being produced by the continent,
and it affords the principle facilities for s hipping those
metals to ports accessible to the \'lest without passing
through

~uez

and the Mediterranean

~ea .

318Andrew 1vJ. . Karmarck , "The African ~conomy and International 'l'rade, 11 in 'l'he United States and Africa, \•!alter
Goldschmidt , editor (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, l9b3),
p . 159 .
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One is not surprised to learn of the l•1ay, 1953 ,
establishment of a military command in East Africa under
~ir

George Erskine, just at the time of Egypt ' s revolution

and the establishment of the Nationalist regime . 319
The Nevi York rl'imes commented:
The presumption here is that the eastern half
of Africa, together with Turkey is going to be
called on to replace the center of strength
that was t,;gypt ana the Levant when Britain was
in control there . 320
Also worthy of note is the fact that these events
paralleled the establishment of the Central African Federation, composed of Northern and

~outhern

Hhoaesia and

Nyasalana ) 21
Regarding the United States' grant of aid to the East
African countries , it is of interest to note the operation
of the Mutual

~ecurity

Administration in the early 1950's .

Basil Davidson gives an account of the establishment
of Tanganyika Concessions, an international organization
formed to exploit the mineral wealth of East ana Central
Africa .

319The Nevl York Times, i•Iay 30, 1953, page 4 .
320Ibid . , p . 10 , col . 4.
32lrbia . , p . 10, col . 6 .
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Tanganyika Concessions issued 3,831,412 ordinary
shares in April, 1950 .

'l'he British goverrunent sold

l,b77,9ol shares to an Anglo- oelgian group .

In November,

1950:

• • • bOO,OOO of these shares had been resold
to an American group headed by Ladenburg 'l'halmann
and Company and Lazard Freres of New York, in
association with the International Basic ~conomy
Gorporation ana uavid rtockefeller- -that is, to
the hockefeller interests .322
The extent of the involvement of 1'anganyika Concessions in the economy of East and Central Africa may be
estimated from the following: the company owns a minority
interest in the Union l'•1iniere du Haut Katanga; it operates
the uranium mines from which the United States gets
ninety per cent of its uranium; it owns ninety per cent of
the Benguela Railway which hauls ore to Lobita Bay in
Angola; it has a controlling interest in Kentan Gold
Areas (Kenya) and Uruwira I•1inerals in Tanganyika, and it
is closely connected with the British South Africa Company,
and the Anglo-American Corporation . 3 23

322uavidson, "Cashing in on Old Imperialisms ,"
p . 209 .
3 23Ibid .
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From this resume one readily perceives that the
organization of the economy of East Africa, especially
strategic metals, is complex indeed .
is involved, for in 1952 the Mutual

But , more complexity
~ecurity

Administration

lent :Pl, b40, 000 to Uruwira i 1J.inerals, whicn contracted to
repay the loan with lead and copper . 324
John Gunther commented that,

11

By ana large FOA

and Point Four are much less conspicuous in colonial
territories than in the independent states , like Libya
ana Liberia . n325

He went on to say that JUnerican

technical help had been promised for East Africa .
'I'he llfm tual ::>ecurity Administration v1as intended to
aid small businesses rather than agriculture .
Kenya was denied a request for

~2 . 8

Accordingly,

million for agricul-

tural aid , while Uganda and Tanganyika were granted
assistance to stimulate small industry . 3 2 b
The limitation of grants to small industry leaves a
discrepancy to be accounted for when one remembers that the
IvL. S . A. granted the rather large loan to Uruwira I•Linerals,

324roia .
325John Gunther, Inside Africa {New York: harper and
Brothers, 1953), p . 350 .
32orhe New YorK Times, July 3, 1953, page 6.
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which was in the business of mining a strategic metal for
airplane construction . 327
The importance of
the United

~ta~es,

~ast

Africa in the estimation of

and the direction of

i~s

aid policies,

may be seen in the fact that in 1953 and 1954,

~l,b80,000

were granted to 'l'anganyika for the rebuilding of a road
from Iringa to 1v1orogoro ) 2 8 'l'his road connects the Great
North Road with the port city of Dar es Salaam .
ment of the road to Dar es

~alaam

era1s of better communications

'l'he improve-

assurea the Uruwira Min-

wi~h

shipping in the Indian

Ocean, as well as facilitating the movement of other
necessities in the event of war .
In addition, f. 2,390,000 were granted to the i:ast
African rtailways ana Harbors to facilitate the export of
sisal and other conunodities, and

~.300,000

was granted to

each of the three territories for aia to small industries,
in return for various raw materials • .3 2 9
The New York 'l'imes reported in June, 1955, that the
United

~tates

had granted

~4,161,800

to the

~ast

African

.327united I\lations Review, 1:26, l•Lay, l95b •
.3 28 11 Atlantic li.eport on the .. orld 'l'oday," Atlantic,
19.3:19, January, 1954 •
.3 2 9Ibid .
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countries on a matching fund basis.

In that amount was

~3,887,300 for development in Kenya .330 '1'anganyika had
the most value so far as strategic metals ana communications were concernea, but Kenya received the funds .
Kenya had a large investment from Britain in the
settler farming community and small valuable mineral
deposits .

Also, her communications were alreaay developed,

in the railway w.tlich reached all the way from the port of
Mombasa to Kampala in Uganda .
Uganda received more attention than Kenya, but less
than 'l'anganyika, because of her production of cotton, coffee,
and copper .

Her gross domestic proauct amountea to

~o6

per

head of population . 33l
Coffee exports were restricted by the East African
countries in tne 1959 International Coffee Agreement, which
was advocated by the United ~tates . 33 2

Cotton and coffee

33Q'l,he New York 'l'imes, June 17, 1955, page b .
331Adamantioris Pepelasis and others, Economic
Development (New York: Harper and brothers, 1961), p . 215.
33 2Richard P. Stebbins (ed.), The United States in
Worla Affairs, 1222 (~ew York: Harper and Brothers, 1960T,
pp . 3b7- b8 .
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exports represented an estimated eighty per cent of
Uganda's total foreign sales . 333
\'ihen United e>tates aid to India , in the form of surplus cotton, threatened to eroae the Uganda cotton market in
the same country, a protest was made by a representative of
another form of American aid to

~ast

Africa.

Henry 'l'homas,

a graduate student at l·1assachusetts Institute of Technology,
who was working with the Uganda Development Corporation,
protested to the United btates government . 334
Through the Uganda Development Corporation, the United
~tates

was involved in promoting the economy of Uganda by

giving information a bout investment opportunities in that
country, and as operator of some businesses . 335
Another

1~1 .

I . T . fellow was Project Development

Officer in the Ivdnistry of Commerce and Industry of
'Tanganyika .

He developed the agreement with an Italian

firm to build a refinery in that country.

Later he advised

the government when it acquired an interest in tne 'langanyika Jv,eerschaum Company, which was about to cease
operations . 33b

333'1' . K. Hopkins , "Uganda : 'lhe Politics of Compromise,n Current History , 46:174, I•..arch, 1964 .
334'l'he Nevv Yorker , 42 :124, l••arch 5, 1966
335p epe 1 as1s
. , 2£ •

•t . ,
£!_

p . 247 .

33~'he New Yorker, 42 :116, i•1arch 5 , l9bb .
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Kenya also had its
of

l~J.ichael

1~1 .

I. T. fellow in the person

Roemer, who helped negotiate a loan from the

World bank .

He was Planning Officer in the treasury in

Nairobi . 337
Another incident involving a M. I. T. fellow occurred when l•1ichael Christian, who was the Legal
the

~ast

~ecretary

of

African Common Services 0rganization, was intro-

duced to a gold smuggler as an American missionary from
Tanganyika .

He contracted to buy 4>75 , 000 worth of gold

from the smuggler and his guise of missionary was accepted
at face value.

It did not seem incongruous to the smuggler .338

The l.Vl . I . 'l' . students represented a genuine contribution to the economies and governments of the new iast
African states .

although they may have seemed to work

against the interests of the United
they served that interest .

~tates,

in reality

At the time the concern of the

United btates was with the establishment of stable and
viable governments in the area .
American contributions to
self-serving .

~ast

Africa were not all

Lionel Cliffe wrote in l9b4:

• • • On Independence Day, almost half a
million people in the barren Central Hegion ,

337rbia ., p . 128 .
33 8 rbia ., p . 134 .
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where famine is endemic, were being kept alive
on free issues of United ~tates surplus corn.339
Similarly, A. J .

I~:..eyers

wrote regarding Kenya in 1965

that imports of American corn amounted to some
vmrth .

And)

II

..

. most

U.

~.

~5

million

aia to Kenya-- amounting to

11.7 million dollars this year--goes into education and
agriculture training . n340
United States aid

~o

Africa remains small when com-

pared with other areas of the world .

David Bell estimated,

in l•.ay, 1964, that United ::,tates aid in .africa amounted to
little more than one dollar per capita.341
Arnold Rivkin summed up American attitudes tovmrd
Africa in an article in 1965 by saying:
As the continent receiving the smallest
segment of our aid (less than 10~), Africa
aeserves more if we are to give credence to
our policy of support for African development . 342

339Lionel Cliffe,
46:136, l'i1arch , 1964 .

11

'l'anganyika," Current History,

340A . J . Iv.eyers, 11 Five Years of Freeaom," U. 5. News
ana world Report , 59:56, July 5, 19o5.
341David Bell, "Foreign Aid Today," Department of
State Bulletin, 50:$32, l•1ay 25 , 1964 .
342Arnold hivkin , "Lost Goals in Africa," Foreign
Affairs, 44:123, October, 1965 .
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III .

l~UL'l'I-LA'l'ERAL

Africa, the last continent

~o

AID

experience nationalism,

furnished the largest number of states to the United Nations
organization . 343
l•1any leaders of the African states have advocated
the use of the United Nations as a channel through which
aid would flow from the developed countries to the
undeveloped ones . 344
The result was the formation, in 1958, of the

~conomic

Commission for Africa , which divided Africa into five regions .
~orne

reservations were expressed, in fear that the regions

might become economic and political entities , making later
unity of the whole of Africa more difficult . 345
Meeting in Adois Ababa ,

~thiopia

in 19bl, the

Commission adoptea a program of development which had been
workea out by twenty-four African states .

The plan had the

tacit approval of the United St~tes . 34b

343william G. Carlton , The Revolution in American
Foreign Policy (~ew York : Handom House , l9b3), p . 445 .
344:tw1boya, Freedom and After , p . 180 .
345Ibia . , p . 224 .
34brfans Kohn ana w~allace bokolsky , African Nationali.§E!
in the 'twentieth Century (Princeton : D. Van Nostrand Company,
Incorporated , 19b5), p . 98 .
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Tom Mboya has expressed reticence about the
effectiveness of the plan with the following corrunent :
The multi- lateral arrangements through international agencies coulo help greatly . The only
snag here is that lifrica is moving on to the
international scene at a time when most of the
international agencies have been established ,
and no attempt is being made to reorganize them
to take account of the emergence of Africa .
bo that for some tirue to come , they will presumably continue to function on the basis of
what their original sponsors wanted them to
achieve , without considering what is in the
best interests of the newer nations . 347
'l'he above situation forced the new states into the
position of making bi - lateral agreements for aid . 348

And,

they have attempted to safeguard their sovereignty by
making such agreements with both ~ast and \'lest )49
Arnold ttivkin has summed up the Western approach to
the multi - lateral aici question by saying that the effort
would be basically \/estern and American , although others
would be invited to join.J50

•l'hese efforts continue to be

the substance of American policy .

liegional development

34 'l.rv1boya , l''reedom and After, p . 181 .
348rbia ., p . 180 .
349rbia . , p . 323 .
35°l!;mil Lengyel , "Sub- Saharan Jungle of Dilemmas , "
a review of the book Africa ana the \:est by Arnola .tdvkin,
~at~roay Review , 45 : 22, lv1arch 10-;-T9~
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offers

at~ractive

possibilities in the matters of control

of funds and future political unification of the continent .
IV.

lNV.t'..S1'1',.Ji:N'1' AND

'l'h~DE

An estimate of the market needed to maintain full
employment in the Uni tea :::>tates, after

~Jorld

War II, placed

exports near the ~10 billion mark . 35l

By January, 1952, the value of foreign trade of the
United States had reached the new high of

~25

billion .

Such trade was necessitated by the raw material needs of
the defense program and the Korean har . 35 2
'l'he vital nature of African minerals caused a massive
infusion of American capital for the purpose of developing
and protecting them.
Basil Davidson called on the United States to use
investments for the needs of the African population, as
well as exploitation for profit . 353
A common fear of investors \'vas that their capital
woula be consumed by the fires of nationalism which were

35lb . E. Harris, "Employment and ~xport Trade," New
Republic, 112:111- 14, January 22, 1945 .
3 52 'l'he l'IJ ew York 'l'imes, January 2, 1952, page 49 .
353basil Davidson, 11 Africa: .c;mergent Colossus,"
Nation, 173:167- 89, beptember 8, 1951 .
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evident by the early 1950's .

'l'he J . P .

r~1organ

Company

was concerned about investment opportunities in Kenya,
ana the possible results of the
in progress in that country .

1~1au

l•1au rebellion then

'l'he company was assured that

Britain would not leave Kenya .354
At the end of 1952, the airect investment of the
Unitea t>tates in Africa was placed at
figure compared with

~312

~458

million .

That

million at the end of 1950 .

Some

52 per cent was investea in petroleum , mainly marketing
ana distribution, 20 per cent was investea in mining, and
15 per cent was given to manufacturing . 355
John Gunther estimated that the extent of American
interest in

~ast

Africa was represented in the fact that:

• • • an american oil company haa aevelopment licenses for a petroleum survey in
nortnern Kenya, • • • and an American auto mobile assembly plant is to be built at
1v10mbasa . 35b
He also mentioned that the Coca Cola Company was engaged
in business in Kenya .

3 54'lhe 1~ew York 'l'imes, lJecemoer 9, 1952, page 3 .
355Hernard Blankenheimer, nl-rivate .c.nterprise in
Africa," Africa 'l'oday, G. Grove Haines , editor (Baltimore:
'l'he Johns Hopkins fress, 1955), p . 4b0 .
356Gunther, QE . cit . , p . 350 .
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American investment in the continent increased
42 per cent between 1953 and 1957, amounting to
in 1957.357

~573

million

One estimate placed the increase of American

investment in Africa since 1945 at 2,500 per cent.35B
By 1960, the amount of trade with Africa had reached
a total of about

~1 .2

billion annually, and the investment

was placed at more than ~600 million .3 59
\Vhen the African states became independent, their
leaders insisted that foreign investment and aid be used
to serve the needs of their countries, as they defined
those needs.3 60
Private investment in East Africa, by 1960, amounted
to some $46 million .
mining,

~42

One million dollars were invested in

millions were invested in petroleum, and

~4 millions were invested in trade.361

357John 5cott, "Last Chance in Africa,n Atlantic,
203:93, April, 1959.
358James h . Robinson , Africa at the Crossroads
(Philadelphia: The Vlestminster Press, 1962), p . 12.
359Paul S . Zinner (ed.), Documents on American
Foreign Relations, ~ (New York : Harper ana Brothers,
1960), p. 414.
3 60Bretton, 2£· cit., p . 456.
36l~armarck,

££· cit., p . 172.
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Trade with Bast .Africa in l9bl amounted to
million in imports ana ~19 million in exports . 3 62

~52

The

difference between the two was smoothed out by the infusion
of public funas in the forms of grants and loans .
Total trade figures for Afr ica amounted to 3 . 2 per
cent of United

~tates

~tates imports . 363

exports and 3 . 4 per cent of United

Such figures do not seem large , but

they are enough to induce a significant change in the
overall demand on the production of the inaustrial complex
of the United States .364
'l'he policy of the Unitea

~tates

was to encourage the

export of capital to other areas of the world, and it
underwrote the investments going to high risk places . 3b5
Tied to the policy of guarante eing

investments by

the private sector was the requirement of protective
guarantees by the countries to which the investments were
going .

buch assurances were available in Kenya and

Tanganyika by July, 1964 .

362lbid . , pp . 170- 71 .
3b3Bretton, QQ . cit ., p . 456 .
3 64Bert G. Hickman , Growth and ~tability of the Post !@!: .8conomy (washington : 'l'he Brookings Institution, 1960),
p . l9b .
365vatter, 2£· cit . , p . 268 .
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For each of these countries guarantees were
available with respect to convertibility ,
expropriation , and war risk, incluaing guarantees against loss due to revolution ana insurrection; also extended risk .366
The ..t:ast African countries are desirous of foreign
capital .

President Nyerere stated in l9bb,

n~·le

want

capital investment here so that the amount of wealth which
can be produced in 1anzania is increased, ana our people
will therefore become better off in the future . u3b7
however , l'vi.r . Nyerere goes on to say that his government
wants investment for a purpose, and it will be welcome
only if it fulfills that purpose . 368
Tanzania ' s intention is that investments will
benefit the people as a whole, ana not just the investor . 369
'l'he article in which I•1r . l\iyerere maae the above assertions
was written to defend his policy and its effect upon the
development of his

coun~ry .

lt seems reasonable to assume that the infusion of
American capital into Africa will continue , especially in

36q~iinerals Yearbook, Unitea btates Department of the
lnterior, IV (Washington : Government Printing Office , l9b4J,
p . 947 .

367 Julius l~yerere, "'lhe Costs of Non- Alignment , "
Africa Heport, Vol . II , 7:bb, Gctober, 19Db .
368 . ..
1 0 1.0 .

3o9r
. d ., p .
__Q1_

b 7•
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the areas of strategic metals and petroleum .

The future

development of the continent holds much promise for the
United 0tates as a market for inaustrial goods, as well as
a profitable investment of funds in the exploitation of
natural resources .

CHAPTER VI
O'l'HBR

UNI'l'~D

S'l'A'l'ES INVOLVElVIENTS IN EAST AFRICA
RAC~

I .

AND RACE RELATIONS

An affinity exists between the moaern African and
his American Negro brother .

Such a feeling should not seem

strange, for the Pan- African movement began in the United
~tates,

and the Africans feel a certain amount of gratituae

because of that fact .

'I' om

l-'1boya has said :

It should be understood that we feel a special
kinship with American Negroes , and that we see
our struggles as closely related . Segregation
robs the United States of the moral standing
she needs if she is to give effective leadership
to the free world . 370
Efforts to establish the principle of equality of
the races in the United States were viewed with sympathy
and unaerstanding .

Those who were victims of discrimina-

tion expressed commendation for the government, as well
as an impatience with those who would obstruct its
efforts )71

37°'l'om J. 1~1boya, "Key ~uestions for Awakening Africa, 11
'l'he New York Times I~1agazine , June 2$, 1959, p . 39 .
3 71H.ichard P . ~tebbins ( ed . ), 'l'he United 3tates in
world Affairs , 12§2. (New York : Harper and How, 1966), p-.-26 .
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The American Negro does not identify with the
African to the extent that the African identifies with the
Negro . 372

Probably because he has been cut off from his

homeland for so long and that he has been fully oriented
to Western life, the Negro has thought of himself as an
American first of all .
~ast

African leaders juage the United

~tates

by its

accomplishments in regard to the Negroes among its citizens.
They believe that the freedom struggle in which they have
become engaged is tne struggle of all men of color.373
Perhaps the performance of the Unitea

~tates

in

regard to Africans upon the continent has affected relationships more than the domestic problem, for the Americans
have an equivocal record so far as Africans in bouth Africa,
Rhodesia, Angola, l110zambique, and ;:,outhwest Africa are
concerned . 374

The temporizing attitude of the United

0tates is represented by a statement made by Undersecretary
0atterthwaite:

372Tom J. Mboya, Freedom and After (London: Andre
Deutsch, Limited, l9b3), p . 230 .
373rbid ., p . 242 .
374Richard .P . ~tebbins (ed . ), The United ~tates in
Affairs, 1.2.22. (New York: Harper and Row, 1966),
p. 192 .
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"Our official policy is clear and unmistakably
opposed to racial discrimination . Nevertheless,
in view of our own domestic problems in the field
of racial relations, the United States should in
good conscience avoid attempting to suggest to
any African territory specific solutions to
these problems . "375
African students in the United

~tates

have complained

that Negroes often exhibit an unfriendly and superior attitude toward them . 376
East Africa has its own racial problems .

'l'he

settlers in Kenya , the Indians in all the territories,
the Arabs along the coast and on the island of Zanzibar ,
all contribute to a racial problem which rivals any other
difficulty . 377

An influx of Indians into East Africa in

1952 raised some serious problems for all governments in
the area .3 7 8
Tribalism also represents a formidable problem for
the East African states .

Indeed, some observers have

375Joseph C. Satterthwaite , quoted in Documents on
American Foreign Relations , 1222, Paul E . Zinner , editor(New York: Harper and Brothers , 1960), p . 412 .
376"Disappointed Africans," Newsweek, 58:30 ,
December 18, 1961 .
3 77Frank :rv~oraes , "The Importance of Being Black ; an
Asian Looks at Africa," Foreign Affairs, 43 : 99, October , 19c4.
378c. L . ~ulzberger , a dispatch from Dar es ~alaam ,
Tanzania for The Nev1 York Times , December 31 , 1952, page 4.
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suggested that the new countries will founder on the
difficult problem of tribalism . 379
Negroes in the United

~tates

have been able to assert

themselves to an extent approached by no other Western state .
Africans are aware of this fact and their estimation of
United btates ' racial policy is that it is proceeding in
the desired direction .

When the Kenya Africans made a

pilgrimage to London in l9b0 to write a constitution ,
their counsel was Thurgood l\larshall )SO
elevation of

I~.~.arshall

to the

~upreme

The very recent

Court of the United

0tates probably will favorably affect relations with

~ast

Africa .
II .

A~SI~TANCI!:

TO LABOR

East African nationalism has been closely connected
with the labor mov ement .

Tom I'v1boya , who is deeply involved

in the labor organizations of Kenya, as well as the politics
of the country, says that the real beginning of unionism in
Kenya was during the l>1au Iv.~.au emergency . 3Sl
379A . J . Toynbee, "Africa : .birth of a Continent,"
0aturday Review, 47:27, December 5, 1964; ~lspeth Huxley,
n Africa's First Loyalty, n The New York Times l•1agazine,
September 18, 1960, p . 14.
380vona1d \'Ieidner, A history of Africa !:Iouth of the
Sahara (New York : Vintage Books, 19o4T, p . 419 .

3811~1boya, Freedom ana After, p . 195 .
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In 1953 there were seven unions in Kenya, and by
1963 there were twenty-eight .

These unions have combined
to form the Kenya Federation of Labor . 382 The unions of

Kenya were aided by the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions, in the persons of David Newman and
Jim Bury . 3 83 These men helped Africans to organize and
to specify their aims as labor organizations .
The American Federation of Labor also aided the
Africans of Kenya by giving them access to their publications, as well as other aid . 384
From Kenya, the development began in Tanganyika,
when Mboya visited Dar es Salaam in 1955 .

In the capital

of 1anganyika, he talked with Rashidi Kawawa, who was
Secretary of the Civil ~ervants Association.385
suggestion of

~boya,

At the

the leaders of the various union

organizations agreed to form the Tanganyika Federation of
Labor, and the movement in that territory became national
in scope.3 86

3 82Ibid . , p. 196 .

3B3Ibid., p . 36 .

384Ibid .

3 8 5Ibid., p . 197.

386Ibid .
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lV
Iboya also visited Uganaa in 1955 for the same purpose as his trip to Tanganyika .

He found that the laborers

in that country were much harder to organize than in Kenya
or Tanganyika , and their progress was noticeably slower .
The Uganda laborers only began to take an interest when the
organization showed some tangible results . 3 87
John 0cott gave an American appraisal of the labor
movement ' s importance in Africa by asserting in 1959 that
" . • • the labor unions constitute one of the most
important barriers to Gomn1unist infiltration into the
continent • 11 3 88
The response of American labor officials was
appropriate, attested by the following analysis by the
Council on Foreign Relations in 1959 :
Requests for assistance have been made directly
to American labor leaders who have visited Africa
and by African leaders who have visited here . In
response, aid is being given airectly and through
the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions and other free labor organizations with
which American unions are affiliated . 389

388John ~cott , "Last Chance in Africa,n Atlantic,
203:93, April , 1959 .
389Paul ~ . Zinner (ed . ), Documents 2n American
Foreign Relations, 1222 (New York : Harper and Brothers ,
l9t>O), p . 418 .
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~ast

African unions have followed the forms of

American unionism .

Illlboya remarked. that

11

. . • we also

became convinced we would have to move to the American
and Canao.ian system of a ' check- off ' payment of dues,

...

.u390

The system was placed upon the statute books

of Tanganyika , and was accepted. by many employers in Kenya
and Uganda on a voluntary basis . 391
While more extensive resources would. no doubt reveal
a deeper involvement of American Labor with the East
Africans, the above citations attest to the fact that this
country was significantly engaged in efforts to organize
the workers of

~ast

Africa into effective unions .
III .

EDUCATION

The United 0tates has played an important role in
the education of Africans since world har I .

A few students

made their way to this country ana studied in various fields.
They were generally poor, lonely, and discriminated against,
and they all crune to the conviction that Africa was not
destined to be the dependency of Europe, but that they, too,
had distinctive contributions to make to the worla .

39'1~1boya , Freedom ana After, p . 190 .
39lrbid ., p . 191 .
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Prior to 111orld
homeland .

v~ar

II, few Africans ever left their

But, some aid leave , travelled broadly, and

usually found their way to America .

'l'he United 0tates

provided much of the stimulus for the movement toward
nationalism . 392
Perhaps the small number of Africans studying in the
United 0tates helps explain the success of their venture .
~ecause ,

had the number been very large , the colonial

authorities probably would have tried to thwart their
efforts , as they did in the case of Gatheru .
The number of Africans in American schools always
remained small .

A report in July, 1952, gave the total

number of foreign students in the Unitea States as 30,462 .
Significantly, there was no estimate of the number of
African students . 393
Although small groups were aiding Africans in
education in the United

~tates ,

perhaps the first signifi-

cant organization was the African- American Institute,
founded in 1953, which began to expedite the movement of

39 2Hans Kohn and #allace ~okolsky , African National ism in the 'l'wentieth Century (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand
Company, 1965), p . 22 .
393J . \"/. Gardner, nForeign Students in America,"
Foreign Affairs , 30 : 637- 50, July, 1952 .
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Africans to the United

~tates .

The organization set up

an office in Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika to process applications for scholarships ana other matters related to the
students ' preparations for college . 394
Tom

Iv~boya

came to the United States in 1956 and

found that scholarships had been offered to £ast African
students, but they were unable to pay for their transportation .

'!'he problem was presented to the American Committee

on Africa ana means were found to transport a number of
students to the United States . 395
In 1959 , the African- American Students Foundation
was begun with the purpose of raising money to charter aircraft to transport East African students to the United

~tates )96 'l'hat year saw eighty- one students transported
by the airlift, one of whom later became the wife of
f•.r . M.boya . 3 97
The founding of the African- American

~tudents

Founda-

tion, and its subsequent activities , provided impetus for

394l•1boya, Freedom and After, p . 145 .
395rbid . , p . 59 .
397lb'~a.
.

396rbid. , p . 138 .
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further action by official groups, as l•1boya notes in his
account of the events .
The African- American btudents Foundation spurred on the Ivy League colleges to set up ASPAU ,
and it also stirred the Institute of International Education, which is a private agency
handling educational exchange for the U. ~ .
Government on a contract basis, to expand its
then small programme . 398
The small size of the budget for African education
may be seen in the comment of Time in 1960 when it said,
nThe State Department spends less on African education

(~2,000,000 this year) than it does in any other area . u399
The year l9b0 provided an interesting incident
involving African students .

,,ben the students could not

meet the expense of travel to the United btates, they asked
the Bisenhower Administration to finance the project .
'l'he government refused to grant their request, but John F .
Kennedy arranged for the necessary funds through the
'
.
400
Kenne dy F ounaat~on
.
The presidential campaign was in progress and the
response of Kennedy provided abundant publicity for him .

398rbia . , p . 145 .
399rime, 76 : bl, ~eptember 5, 1960 .
4{)0Arthur Jv1 . ~chlesinger, Jr . , A Thousand Days
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), p . 554 .
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The government later offered the money needed, but the
Kennedy Foundation funds had already been accepted . 40l
1he Department of

~tate

made

the purpose of transporting
United States . 4° 2

~100,000
~ast

available in 1961 for

African students to the

The students who came to American schools were at
the heart of East African life, since they were in positions to contribute to the progress of the people .

They were

clerks, teachers, secretaries, draughtsmen, laboratory assistants, surveyors, postal clerks, salesmen and health inspec tors . 403

The contribution of American educational enter-

prises will never be ascertained with finality , but it must
be considered important.
The public school system made an indelible impression
on many of the students .

A representative comment is the

following, taken from 1'he New York Times Iv1agazine: none of
the really great things about America that I have been discovering since my arrival is your public school system . n404

40lrJiboya, Freedom and After, p. 146 .
4°2 rbid ., p. 139 .

403rbia., p . 148 .

404Amos Kiriro, "An African ~tudent Studies Us,n
The New York Times Magazine, December 10, 1961, pp . 114-15 .
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'!'he number of students continued to increase as the
countries of East Africa progressed toward , and acquired ,
independence .405
Not only have Americans contributed to education on
the advanced levels , but they have been deeply committed to
education within the .t:ast African countries .
the Jeanes School at Kiambu , Kenya .

An example is

'!'his school was named

for Anna '1' . Jeanes of Phil adel phia, who contributed to its
support .

Primarily , the school is for adult education ,
which is an impressive need of East Africa . 4° 6 Later , the
Agency for International .uevelopment contributed money for
the conversion of the Jeanes

~cnool

into the Kenya Insti-

tute of Administration .407
Literacy among adults has been of much concern to
the governments of .l!;ast Africa .

Consequently , many groups

have designed programs to attack the problem of adult
education . 408

405Joseph ~ . Nye, Jr ., Pan- Africanism ~ ~ast African
Integration (Cambridge , I'-'1assachusetts : Harvard University
Press , l9o5J , p . 81; Africa Report , December , 1966, p . 22 .
406a . l-i . 'l' • .Kimble , "Compelling Need, Educa~ion for
Africans , " '!.'he New York 'lirr.es l·!agazine , r~.arch 5 , l9bl , p . 31 .
407Iv1boya , Freedom_ and hfter , p . 153 .
408Ibid ., p . 152; Unpublished minutes of 'l'he Baptist
Mission of ~ast Africa , rlUgust 23, 1956 , on file witn The
~,oreign l•!ission board of 'l'he ~outhern baptist Convention,
hichmond , Virginia .
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vfuen independence came to the East African countries,
there was a critical shortage of secondary school teachers .
A response to this need was made by the United .States \vhen
the Agency for International Development asked Columbia
University to send 157 teachers to the area .

They received

training at Columbia , with additional orientation at
I~1akerere

College in Uganda .

African countries .409

They served in all the East

In three years the program sent

more than 370 secondary teachers to iast Africa to relieve
one of the most pressing needs faced by the countries . 410
An example of multi- lateral aid to education in all
of Africa is the
in 19b4 .

UNE~CO ~pecial

Fund, which was inaugurated

The fund was given a total of

~$5

million which

was to be spent in forty- two countries, twenty- six of
which were in Africa .4l l

The United btates will contribute

heavily to the program , as it does to all Unitea Nations
projects .

409Gertrude bamuels , "In Answer to Africa ' s l'~eed for
Teachers , " The li.Jew York Times l•'i agazine, I~~arch 1$ , 19D2,
pp . 89- 90 .
410nTeachers for East Africa,n :Jchool illJ.d bociety,
Vol . 91, 1~1arch 23, l9b3, p . 137 .
411James A. Joyce , "Priorities in African r;ducation , "
baturaay_ l:tevie\'r , 46 : 55, April 15 , 1964 .
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IV .
~erhaps

THE

P~AC~ CORP~

nothing excited the idealism of young

Americans more than the Peace Corps .

Createa by President

Kennedy, the Corps was designed to mobilize the idealism
of America ' s youth , and , in the process, to make a con12
tribution to the welfare of developing nations . 4
The energetic young Americans were not received 'Without questionings however , and it was necessary for the
director to allay the fears of the fledgling governments
aoout tne purpose of tne organization . 41 3
A report of the work of the Peace Corps in Bast
Africa in 1966 gave the total number of volunteers as 649 .
Of that total, 457 were engaged in teaching, either in
elementary or secondary education . 414
An indication of the contribution being made by the
teachers in the Peace Corps is seen in the following comment:
The Peace Corps had become a vital force in
African education, particularly secondary
education . It had encouraged an expansion of
African school systems , challenged the habit of
rote learning , ana, to a lesser extent, dampened

412~chlesinger, QE • cit . , p . bG6 .

413Ibid ., p . 607 .
4140tanley I~1eisler, "Peace C.orps Teaching in Africa, u
Africa Heport, December, 196b, p . 18 .
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elitism in the schools . It is trying to help
African leaders prevent tteir schools from becoming factories for the production of facts without thought-- of nskeletons without organs . "415
Without the teachers provided by the Peace Corps,
much of the advancement made by the school systems in East
Africa would not exist . 41 6 'l'he Corps has been a primary
source of teachers for '1 anzania (Tanganyika and Zanzibar) •4l7
While the primary task of the Peace Corps in East
Africa has been to aia in education, there have been people
\rith other skills working there too .

They have been

engaged in most of the phases of public life in the area .
V.

MIS~ION

UNDERTAKINGS

American missionary efforts in East Africa began in
the nineteenth century and have contriouted much to the area
in many fields .
Groups that have work in East Africa include the
African Inland I1ission , American F'riends , the Church of God,
~eventh

Day Adventists,

415 Ibid . , p . lb .
417rb.
__.!£- .

~outhern

Baptists , Assemblies of God,

4lbib . .
-1:£·
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Salvation Army, t;astern Mennonite Board of 1-.issions ,
Christian I'<lissions in l•1any Lands, Gospel }'urthering Fellowship and the Churches of Christ . 41S
'l'he work of these organizations is spreaa. over the
whole of the three countries of Kenya, Uganaa, and
1anganyika, Zanzibar receiving scant attention . 419
Their work is extensive, taking in most of the fields
of humanitarianism as well as religious activities .
A typical example is given in the excerpt below:
American Frienas have been in Kenya since 1902 .
It is the largest of their five mission fields,
and Kaimosi near Lake Victoria is their largest
station . Here 39 missionaries are carrying on an
ambitious program of medical, ea.ucational, industrial, agricultural, ana evangelistic work .
Particular projects incluae the bible Institute,
Girl's Boarriinb ~chool, Boy 's Boarding School,
Junior ~f.issionary bchool, Inaustrial Department,
Agricultural Department, Nen's 'reacher Training
Center, Women 1 s 1'eacher '!'raining Center, Press,
~Jork Camp and Hospital .
Besides all this there
is an extensive school program on the primary
and intermediate levels , which provides education for almost 40,000 chilriren . Bible teaching is given in all schools. '!'he work at
Kamusinga, opened in 1957, centers around a
seconaary school . 420

418hobert Hall Glover, The Pro Tress of ~:orld \Jide
I•.issions , revised by J. he rbert KaneNew York : Harperana rtow, l9b0), pp. 32b- 35.
419I..iartha L . I•loennich, 1iorld Missj..Q!!.§_ (Grana Rapias ,
Michigan : The Zondervan Press, 1950), pp. 145- 4b .
420Glover, ££ • cit . , p . 326 .
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~~ile

other mission groups do not conform precisely

to the foregoing example , it indicates the scope of work
of mission groups in all the East African countries .

Some

have concentrated their efforts on a few types of work,
but all have engaged in a broad ministry .

Southern Baptists

entered East Africa in 1956, establishing a specialized
hospital at lV
!beya, 'l'anganyika, and a goodwill center ,
with adult literacy work , at Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika . 4 21
That mission endeavors are extensive , and their
accomplishments impressive are undeniable .

tim•Tever, many

question the motivations for a voluntary engagement in
sucn work .
H. C. Goerner , becretary for Africa for the Foreign
1v.~.ission

Board of 'l'he ::louthern Baptist Convention has stated

the motivation in terms of the eternal purpose of God to
bring salvation to all of mankind .

The incentive for the
individual is to help in carrying out that purpose . 4 22
Harold Lindsell includes

n.~.ore

in the following

analysis of the motivation for mission work:
\i.hen any Christian notes the spiritual ,
physical, and moral morass of the pagan world,

4 21---±£.,
rb · ·
p . 335 •
4 22 H. C. Goerner, Thus lt Is dritten (Nashville,
'l 'ennessee: 'l'he Convention Press,- 1944), p . 34 .

lbl
all of which he knows to be the consequences
of sin and when he realizes that he himself
has been delivered from this bondage and
corruption without works and by grace , constraint, of necessity, is laid upon him to
bring to otners the same opportunity for
deliverance which has been tlis . 423
Such an estimate includes more than an interest in
the future salvation; it becomes cultural and implies that
the technical and economic aspects of the American , or
Western, society is the result of the Christian Gospel .
Robert Hall Glover is more explicit when he enumerates the motivations for mission enterprises .

He first

talks about the physical condition of the mission fields
ana associates them with the absence of Christianity .
Next he gives the moral circumstance of the pagan, speaking of the various cultural practices such as caste ,
polygamy, and others .
of mission work.

'l'his , too, is a central motivation

His last element is the spiritual con-

dition of the heathen . 424
~oruetimes

it is intimated that the concern with the

physical ana cultural elements is prompted by a desire to

4 2 3Harold Lindsell , lv.issionary Principles and Practice
( ~ Jestwooa, 1~ew Jersey : Fleming H. ltevell Company, 1965),
p . 4b .
4 24Glover, ££· cit . , p. 4 .
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find ways of ministering to the spiritual neeas of the
people.425

Such an analysis would explain many of the

enterprises into which missionaries go , such as hospitals
ana schools .

But , it does not explain the extent, univer-

sality and permanence of' such commitments .
Lindsell indicates that the mission concern is also
humanitarian and cultural .
Christianity can and does do something about
physical conditions . One of its most important
by- products is that humanitarian concern which
corrects these tragic anomalies through education , example , and CnrLstian zeal . 42b
henry P . Van Dusen, writing in l9b4 , indicated a
strong concern over the fact tnat the missions of Africa
have remained fragmented in the traditional Protestant
divisions .

It is his thought that such division has left

African missions unable to cope with the problems of the
emerging denominations in these countries .4 2 7
Another writer ' s opinion is that in order to minister
to Africa , the Church must disengage itself from the various

4 2 5Johnni Johnson , \'/hat Do I~!issionaries Do?
(Nashville , 1ennessee : uroadman ~ress , 19b4) , p . 11 .

42~indsell, 2£· cit ., pp . 47- 4$ .
4 2 7Henry P . \1 an Deusen, 11 '1'hird '1'roughts on Africa , "
Christian Century, 81 : 855 , July 1 , ~9c4 .

forms of secular enterprises and turn to direct evangelism,
somehow finding unity in the process . 4 2S
l•wst obse r vers will agree that the present attitude
of African church leaders is ecumenical and they advocate
more involvement in the political life of the countries .
The All- Africa Conference of Churches , held in Kampala ,
Uganda in l9b3, gave a picture of Africans who want a
Pan- African church movement similar to that of the political
sphere .

It also indicated that the old system of missionary

supervision was doomed . 429
A certain ambivalence is practiced by many of the
American denominations working in East Africa .
Baptists are an example .

Southern

rl'he mission organization is a

member of all of the Ctristian Gouncils of the countries
involved .

'l'he minutes of the second meeting of the Baptist

li'iission of East Africa contain the following motion:
~otion passed that we seek to affiliate
ourselves with the Christian Councils of
Tanganyika and Kenya and that we cooperate

4 2Scecil 1~orthcott, "Christian Democracy in Africa, 11
Christian Century , 68 :1435, December 12, 1951 .
4291:.. . G. Parker, "All Africa Christianity," Cnristian
Century, 80:670- 72, hay 22 , l9b3 .
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with them so long as it does not involve compromising our Baptist principles . 430
Membership in, ana cooperation witn, the Christian Councils
has continued to the present time .
The Councils fill an evident need in coordinating the
cooperative activities of the various missions, such as that
of the Kenyans in 1954, when they asked for help in rehabilitating the many thousands of former I~lau r·1au followers . 43l
~uch

a task would have been impossible for any of the missions

alone, as indeed it was beyond the means of the Christian
Gouncil of Kenya, for it had to ask for emergency help from
sympathetic Christians in other countries .
'l'he Christian Council of 'l'anganyika has had a refugee
project since the influx of Africans fleeing from Rwanda ,
as well as other cooperative efforts . 432
'l'he pract ical value of the Christian Councils is not
only in the area of expediting cooperative ventures, but
also in the fact that the governments prefer to deal with

430unpublished minutes of The Baptist l'lission of East
Af1ica, December 0, l~5o, on file with 'l'he Foreign ~ission
Board of The ::>outnern baotist Lonvention, h.ichmond, Virginia .
431J·ames H. Robinson, Africa at the Crossroads
(Philaaelphia: The Westminster Press, l9b2), p . b9 .
43 2..t.award Hawley, "'l'anganyika-Zanzibar, u Christian
Century, 81 :1182, September 23, 1904 .
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only one organization rather than many .

The future indi-

cates even closer organization of the religious groups in

~ast Africa; the Africans are demanding it . 433
Sir Philip Mitchell, former Governor of Kenya, has
remarked, when asked about the causes of the twentieth
century revolution in Africa:
Well, I believe that, fundamentally, it was
the Bible, the Bible and the brave, determined,
merciful men and ,.,10men who carriea it and i t.s
message of hope--hope of the end of the slavetrade, of prevention of epidemics and relief of
famine, of protection from the savage whims of
tyrants or the obscene orgies of sorcerers-to a people who were living in a brutish
lethargy induced by continuous danger, horrors,
and sufferings . 434
bir Philip was voicing the conviction of the colonialists, who thought that their task was to bring v'iestern civilization to the continent .

He equated the work

of missions with the civilizing work of the British
government .
That the same attitude was held by some missionaries is a pparent from the comments of various critics of
mission policy .

J. H. H.obinson \vrote in 1953,

11

Unfortu-

nately, the communists, the nationalists, ana the

433A . J . Parel, "Christianity and Colonialism,"
Commonweal, 65:482, February $, 1957.
434:::,ir .Philip r•1itchell, t!Africa and the 1'/est in
historical Perspective, 11 Africa Touay, C. Grove Haines,
eaitor (baltimore: The johns Hopkins Press, 1955), p. 15.
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secularists often equate the missionary movement with the
colonial exploitation, sometimes with justification . n435
Another writer states that,

n

•••

it is not the

old-line mission denominations from Europe and America
which championed the cause of revolution in Africa . n436
The writer further remarked that the political leaders of
Africa had found the churches to be reactionary and opposed
to the changes taking place .

This seemed strange to them,

because they respected the role played by the missions in
the early progress of the Africans.
The failure of the missions to comprehend the arift
of the new spirit causea wholesale defections among some of
the tribes of Africa .
churches during the

The Kikuyu particularly deserted the

1~1au

Mau uprising .

but , it must be

emphasized that the defection was incipient long before the
publicized rebellion.437
Elijah

r~.asinde

was one of the many native religious

leaders of Africa to form entirely indigenous churches .

435James H. Robinson, "Africa and Asia 's Challenge to
l•lissions ," Christian Century, 70:133, February 4, 1953 .
43 6G. i~..cCleod bryan, "Revolution and Religion in
Africa ," Christian Century, 78:12, January 4, l9t>l.
437nRevolt Against Christianity,n 'l'ime, 75:7b,
June 13, 1960 .
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He formed a movement based on eclectic aoctrines which
were vaguely Christian.

He also demanded that the

be expelled from Kenya . 43S

~uropean

Such separatist movements have

arisen in many areas of East Africa as well as other
countries on the continent.439
The natural proclivity of mission groups to give aid
and comfort to colonialism was recognized ana efforts have
been made to change the attitudes of the missionaries toward
their African proteges, taking them into full partnership
with the missionaries in the posts of management and policymaking .

In t his way it is hoped that the separatist

movements will be stifled and the mini stry of the churches
to Africa may be preserved .440
It is hoped also

th~t

mission bodies will be able to

exert a stabilizing influence on the African states as they
consolidate their rule and evolve indigenous institutions
throughout their national life . 44l

438c. . L . ~ulzberger, ur'au kau and Christianity , 11 The
New York tim~, January lo, 1953, page 3 .
439Robinson , £2· cit ., 1 . 72.
44°:t.bia., p . oo .
441Leo Silberman , "Challenge to lJ•issions in Africa,"
Chri§ti_gn_ Century , 7b:386, Aprj_l l, 1959 .
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'l'he failure of American missionaries to distinguish
between their culture ana the essential Christian Gospel
has been the greatest single mistake in Africa .

The comment

of an African in the American Journal of bociology makes
the point clearly .
'I'he establishment of Christian missions in
Africa has been an act of spiritual aggression;
they operated on the principle that everything
African and indigenous is contrary , while everything ~uropean ana foreign is acceptable to the
will of God . The glaring contradiction between
religious theory and the economic and political
practices of Christians has made Africans aistrust the Christian Church , and it is losing
ground through its own fault . 442
The seriousness of the effect on sociological matters
is made also in the same publication , when an author
commented :
Missionaries represent a subculture within
\Iestern culture . 'l'hey stress theology ana the
moral taboos more than ao their fellow- countrymen .
~ccording to the prejudices of their sects ,
l''issions combat nakedness , manners , and the mores
concerning marriage , health , property , and what
they accomplish is characteristically a compromise
between Western and indigenous ways . In some cases
easily assimilable , the new traits may weaken the
family and the prestige of the chief , destroy
social classes and create new ones , and usurp the
native arts . 443

442Ako A.aJe~, "Imperialism ana Spiritual Freedom: An
african View,n runerican Journal of bociology, 50:189- 98,
November , 1944 .
443G . Gordon Brown, "I•.issions anci Cultural Diffusion, n
American ~ournal of bociology, 50:215 - 19, November, 1944 .
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L . K. Painter, comn.enting on the a.isruption of
customs in Kenya by the missionaries, says:
Too frequently the first action of these
well- meaning newcomers is figuratively to
sweep clean the African hut of all primitive
practices regardless of their worth to
people living under long established
cultures . 444

A typical call for changing cultures is seen in a
book writ ten by

l·~artha

L.

I-~oennich .

She speaks of the

elements of the culture of Africa \vithout asking v-1hether
those practices have value to the hfricans, or whether
they really ao contradict the Christian Gospel . 445
A typical excerpt is given below:

\Jnen young boys ana girls are initiated into
adolescence, the vile rites performed (in many
tribes) are physically harmful ana. morally
degrading and beyona. description, when the
cnilaren are taken to fetish groves and made
to sin . Is there not an urgent call for the
Gospel to set men free from tnis terrible life?
how beautiful are the feet of those missionaries who have gone in the past, who are there
now and who are on their way out there . 446
An apt rejoinder is that of L . K. Painter, writing in
Christian Century, when he commented regarding the

444L . K . Painter, n'l'o ::>it ~mere Kenyans bit,"
Christian Century, 76:1337, November 18, 1959.
445lvloennich, 2£ · cit . , p . 139.
446rb·d
____.!_ • ' p • 142 .
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missionaries of Kenya and the Kikuyu,

11

Actually, they have

little direct contact with local village life.n447
In the same article, Painter accused many missionaries of spending several years in Kenya without learning
the native language, either the local vernacular or the
trade language, Kiswahili~4 8

He chargea tnat,

11

•••

they

have little real knowledge of the people whom they seek to
convert and are not seriously concerned about their social,
economic ana political problems . 449
Harold Lindsell stated:
Iviissionaries are bound by the cultures in which
they have oeen raised, ana all other cultures are
foreign to them . 'l'he temptation for mortal men
is to regard their particular culture as sacrosanct and to think of all other cultures as "queer . 11
l·10re than t hat, many people think of t heir culture
as being "rightn and suppose that those vlho do
things some other way are 11 wrong . " bince the
missionary is hurr.an, the chances are that he, too,
will tend to think and to evaluate other cultures
against his background ana with the unspoken
assumption that whatever is not in agreement with
his culture is somehow suspect . 450
American missionaries have educated the Africans
in their schools, taught them the precepts of the Bible,

447Painter, QQ . cit . , p . 1337 .
44$Ibid .

449rbid .

450Lindsell, ££· cit . , p . 278.
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and then have been highly surprised ana indignant when
their pupils have asked them to practice tne simple gospel.
'lhey, too, recognize the veneer of culture over American
mission enterprises .451
There is no question but that missions have contributed to the moaern situation in Africa .

They have made

contrioutions in all the fields of endeavor, and they have
raised the African ' s view of himself, allowing him to walk
with priae in the world . 452

The tragedy is that they

failed to recognize what was essential Christianity and
what was merely cultural .
The

resul~

has been to create a generation of Africans

who are caught between two worlds, belonging somehow to both,
but really to neither . 453

The consequence is that the

moaern African is intent upon taking that which is obviously
valuable in the gospel and harmonizing it with the evident
values inherent in the culture that spawned him .

Painter

gives a reasonable solution to the problem of future
missions in iast Africa:

451Painter, Q£ · cit . , p .

l))b .

45 2R.obert Ezra Park, nlviissions and the f•loaern \~orld,"
Americ~ Journal of ~ociology, 50:177-78, November, 1944 .
453Branislaw I•..alinowski, "Pan- African Problem of
Culture Contact," American Journal of ::>ociology, 48:o49,
Iv1ay, 1943 •
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Kingdom building in Kenya calls for prophets
and Christian statesmen . The leadership of the
emerging church must be African and not Western .
The Churches of the West can help train leaders
who will not be hampered by denominational pre judices ana practices . A living Church in
Kenya must be set in the natural social landscape of indigenous African culture . 454

454Painter, ££· cit . , p . 1338 .

CHAP'1Eh VII
Sll1-1l•..AhY AND Cui\CLUSION
African nationalism received much of its impetus
and inspiration from Negro leaders in the United

~tates .

The first organized efforts to project the African goals
were made by American Negroes .

Led by Negro agitators,

who insisted that their race retain its distinctive culture ana comn1unity feeling, the movement gained momentum
slowly, culminating in tne 194> Pan- African Congress in
Manchester ,

~ngland .

Basil uavidson asserts :

In this respect the sixth congress, hela at
kanchester in 1945, was crucial . here for the
first time the Old Guard from over the ocean
was flanked by new men from the continent
itself; obscure young men, ~·or the most part,
whom few in England (or anywhere else) had
ever heard of-- among them Kenyatta from Kenya ,
Nkr~1ah from the Gold Coast, Akintola from
Nigeria , Johnson from Sierra Leone . 455
Official attitudes in the United 0tates respected
the jurisaiction of the European nations and shrank from
any direct involvement with African aspirations .

~uch

policies continued until it became evident that the newly
inaepenaent nations were capable of exerting sufficient

455basil Davidson, ~Jhich \4/ay Africa'! (Harmoncisworth,
inglana : Penguin Books , l9G4), p . b3 .
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pressure to preserve their sovereignty, and were capable
of competing in the technical world of the twentieth
century .
'l'he official change of attitude was signaled by the
creation, in 1957, of the African Bureau in the Department
of State .

'!'he action was commentea upon by the Council

on Foreign Relations in the following manner:
The establishment within the State Department during the year of a special Bureau of
African Affairs, headed by an Assistant
Secretary of ~tate, testified to the realization of Congress and tt1e executive that African
matters could no longer be handled, as in the
past, as an adjunct of ~uropean or Near ~astern
policy . 456
United

~tates

interest in Africa has been to main-

tain the availability of the raw materials of the continent for

v~estern

productive capacity, while keeping the

African nations stable and viable as political and
economic units . 457
'!'his interest has been both selfish and philanthropic .

It has sought to gain markets for proauctive

capacity, maintain the flow of raw materials, and keep

45 6hichard P . btebbins (ed . j, The United b~ates in
\·J orld Affairs, ~ (l'llew York : Harper ana Brothers, l959J,
p . ZbO .
457Harola G. Vatter, The U. s . Economy in the l950 1 s
(N ew York:~·~ . w'l . Norton and Company, l9b3), p . 258 .
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the Africans amenable to the United

~tates '

foreign policy .

Yet, it has also been deeply interested in the well-being
of the African states .

Public opinion has been especially

sensitive to the latter .
Problems have always existed in the relations
between the African states and the United States .

~ast

Africa has been especially sensitive to the ebb and flow
of American policy, aware of the existence of po\ver and
the relationship between power and the independence of
states .
~ast

IJlainly , differences that have arisen between the

African states and the United

~tates

have been the

result of varying patterns of thought and basic
philosophies .

However, some tense relations have developed

out of the selfish motives of both parties .
The United States has had a large economic interest
in Africa for many years .

But, the advent of the atomic

age gave them an even greater interest in the stability
and friendliness of the new African states .

~ven

where

the investment remained small, in relation to the total
wealth of the United States, the relative size of the
investment within the countries has given them a control
of the economic affairs of the states .
Government aid has also tendea to transfer control
of the economies to the United States, by way of giving

176
security for loans and investments .

While the United

btates may not exercise direct governmental control,
effective control of some countries is maintained through
economic manipulations .
Bast Africans are biased toward the west because of
t.heir long association with the British .

They find it diffi -

cult to exchange connections, that have been made for nearly
a century, for others that are tenuous ana to be made with
strange people . 458
Those connections are more extensive than the governmental ana economic connections which have characterized
their modern history .

They extend to fielas sucn as

education, religion , and other causal forces .

'l'hese cannot

be shed easily, since they condition all that the new
countries are, or wish to become .
The West has contributed to the nature of modern
East Africa .

It has provided the institutions which

characterize their modern governments .

It has provided

t he impetus for their growth of national feeling, represented by the history of the United

~tates .

It has

458Julius K. Nyerere, n'l'he Costs of Non- Alignment, 11
Africa Heport, Vol . 11, 7:ob, Octooer, l9bb .
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contributed the form and substance of modern education in
~ast

Africa, as well as the reasons for giving ana acquir-

ing an education .

It has given to Africa the leavening

effect of the Christian Church.

Although the motives and

results may not always have met the high standards of
Christian ethics,459 all that modern ~ast Africa is has
been influenced by the Christian Church.
To summarize , it may be said that the policies of
the United States have been dually prompted .

'l'he govern-

ment has been motivated by pragmatic considerations, taking
into account relations with all the rest of the world.
Privately , ana this has affected to some extent the
official policy, the United States citizen has been
motivated by idealism in his relations with the African
states .

The result has been, at times, an equivocal

position .

Yet, it seems that the two have been able to

so modify each other that neither has entirely pre vailed .

~o

the United 5tates has been able to maintain

the \•estern influence in Africa and at the same time it
has been able to effectively use the basic iaealism
inherent in this country .

459'l'om J . lviboya , Freedom and After (London : Andre
Deutsch, Limited , l9b3), p . 19 .
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World War II brought about a realignment of the
power structure among the nations of the world .

'l'he primary

conflict of interest developed between Russia and the

~lest

ern nations, with the United btates predominant among them.
Through the leverage afforded by the

~ast-West

con-

flict, African nations were able to exert enough force to
dislodge the colonial powers which had ruled them for
nearly a century .
harly efforts to unite the African people were
carried out in the United btates and other w·f estern nations,
with American Negroes leading the drive .
were W. E . B. DuBois and

I~~arcus

Among these men

Garvey .

The United States conducted its foreign policy, with
regard to Africa, through the European capitols which
controlled the African areas of interest .

This policy con-

tinued until 1957, when it became evident that the African
states would indeed achieve independence .

In that year,

the African Bureau was created in the Department of State .
Economic policy was central in all the policy considerations in the post-war period.

Europe had to be

rebuilt and made strong, in order to resist the push of

Russia in the East.

But, in giving aid to Europe, the

United States stood to gain a large export trade in every
segment of the economy.

The rising capabilities of the

rest of the world created markets for the production of
goods in the United

~tates.

haw materials were of vital importance.

In Africa

the United States sought to protect the precious store of
fissionable material, which included the major portion of
the American supply.
East Africa was important because of its supplies
of industrial diamonds, exotic metals, and its strategic
communications potential if war should come with Russia.
The United States contributed to African progress
toward independence in many ways, including the revolutionary tradition of the country, the expressed idealism
of its citizenry, educational work, and religious
enterprises.
The revolutionary tradition of the United States
gave incentive to the Africans, who felt that there was
a kinship between them because of the common revolt
against Britain .

American leaders tended to encourage

such an identification through their numerous idealistic
statements advocating self-determination and other aspirations.

Educational contributions were made through the
American universities which gave scholarships to Africans
who could qualify and raise money for travel and through
the efforts of many sacrificing people who worked within
the East African countries .

These latter were chiefly

missionaries , although there were others, who were
supported by agencies in the United States .
l•1issions aided the progress of .l!.ast Africa by
preaching the essential idealism of the Christian Gospel.
The Africans coula not be satisfied with their status of
subjugation after they had heard the tenets of the
Christian Church .
United

~tates

dually motivated .

policies ana involvements have been

On the one hand, they have been moved

by a genuine idealism , which is inherent in the American
system .

On the other hand, the foreign policy has been

directed toward the preservation of the status guo in
world politics and economy since that status gives the
United

~tates

and trade.

an advantage in international politics

